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ABSTRACT
THE RE-INNOVATIO:\l OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY TO A SUSTAINABLE LEAN
ENTERPRISE

For many years the concept of Lean Manufacturing has been applied in automotive
development as a tool to refIne the manufacturing practices to the greatest efflciency possible
through waste reduction. Continuous Improvement is a quality innovation process that
supports this objective, based on the manufacturing pillar - work processes and scientifIc
experiments must be controlled and constantly modifIed and improved by the people who do,
and are accountable for the work. Continuous Improvement implicitly implies the
understanding and recognition of what is a problem and problem solving techniques used to
formulate the best countermeasures to those problems.

The process of Lean Manufacturing embraces a philosophy of excellence, elimination of waste
on value-added operations, employee involvement, and continuous improvement. It is a
journey, an on-going process that results in improved customer satisfaction and hence
corporate profIts. ProfIt is the reward for customer satisfaction. Increase customer
satisfaction and your rewards are higher profIts. This is the best method to maintain or
increase market share. Understanding the basic hierarchy and philosophy of how to increase
profIts is essential to creating a sustainable lean enterprise. The following structured process
outlines the basic questions and answers for any company to ask itself:

v

Process to Sustained Success
Answers:

Questions:

Why are we here?

How do we improve our
business bottom line?
How do we give our
customers what they
want?
Every problem is a
deviation from a
standard!
How do we and our
suppliers achieve
process stability and
system standardization?

To Make Money!

Customer
Satisfaction

Give the customer the products
they want with the quality they
expect.

Structured
Problem Solvi ng

To give the customers what they
want and expect, we must identify
and understand variations in our
processes and parts.

Standardization

Strict adherence to process
standards promotes structured
problem solving and identification
of variations.

Level Scheduling
"Heijunka"

Level production schedule allows
us and our suppliers to achieve
production process stability.

This thesis is about Ford Motor Company getting back to its roots, the heritage it started with
the development of the moving assembly line and the original concept of Lean Manufacturing.
This paper will focus on the creative steps outlined in the Process to Sustained Success
procedure toward the journey of Lean Manufacturing. In addition, the current state of
production processes, and recommended specific corrective actions for the re-innovation of
Ford Motor Company to a sustained lean enterprise in a modern era will be discussed.
Questions will be asked and answered such as: Can Ford achieve sustained success
implementing "The Way Forward" plan, or does "The Way Forward" [16] plan need to
incorporate the Process to Sustained Success to meet Ford's long-term goals?

The

benchmark company for comparison is Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corporation.
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Chapter I: Uncle Henry's Company
Introduction

A - History of Manufacturing at Ford Motor Company:

"That line established the efficiency of the method," Henry Ford said regarding the moving
automobile assembly line. [1] The idea of moving the work to the man reached its zenith on
October 17, 1913 at the Highland Park final assembly line when the Ford rigged a chassis that
was slowly pulled across the factory floor by rope and windlass. Parts, components, and 140
assemblers were stationed at different intervals along the 150-foot line. As the winch literally
dragged the chassis across the floor, workers attached parts to the vehicle. When the first car
was finished, production men were amazed at the time saved. Rather than twelve and a half
hours to build a single car, they had performed the feat in five hours and fifty minutes. [2]

Henry Ford first latched onto the concept that instead of bringing the man to the work, as cars
were built in stationary cells at the time, work must be brought to the man. He initially used
cradles that were pushed from one workstation to the next. A breakthrough came early in 1913
when a production engineer in the flywheel magneto assembly area tried a new way to put the
component's parts together. The operation was divided into twenty-nine steps and workers
were instructed to place only one part in the assembly line before pushing the flywheel down
the line to the next assembler. The assembly time was reduced from about twenty minutes to
five minutes per flywheel. This strategy was applied to the construction of the engine and
finally the entire vehicle. [3]
The moving assembly line is only possible through the early inventions of luminaries such as
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Eli Whitney. In the early years of the USA, there was a severe shortage of skilled machinists.
Whitney realized that by using a template, workers with little skill could not only operate
machines, but also produce identical parts that were interchangeable.

Until then, under the English system invented during the Industrial Revolution, skilled
machinists were required to produce parts from a design. But however skilled the machinist,
parts were never identical, and each part had to be manufactured separately to fit its
counterpart - almost always by one person who produced each completed item from start to
finish.

Although there was still a requirement for the craftsmen to create prototypes of the design
before production, they were no longer required in the actual manufacturing. Whitney first
used the system to manufacture muskets. Such was his reputation that the U.S. government
gave him a contract for 10,000 muskets, to be produced within two years, even though he had
no factory or machines. It actually took eight years to deliver the order, as Whitney perfected
and developed new techniques and machines, but he did go on to produce a further 15,000
muskets within the following two years.

Due to the concept of identical and interchangeable parts, Ford's constant revision and
improvements to make a single car drove the build time to only ninety-three minutes in 1914.
The results were immediate and extraordinary allowing Ford Motor Company to produce more
vehicles than all other automakers combined. Benefiting the customer the price for each Model
T Ford dropped from $600 in 1912 to $360 in 1916. "The perfection of the moving assembly
line is Ford's greatest gift to history," says Don Werling, former historical director of the Henry

-2-

Ford Estate, Fair Lane, at the University of Michigan - Dearborn, and founder of the Henry
Ford Heritage Association. [4]

But the great gift Henry Ford gave the world was much more than a moving assembly line - it
was the birth of Lean Manufacturing backed by the splendid notion of continuous
improvement utilizing scientific testing and evaluations - hypotheses created to test the
improved developments of the assembly line. Henry Ford's team investigated new ways to
improve manufacturing techniques and flexibility. At the Rouge complex during the times after
the stock market crash of 28 October 1929 Ford Motor Company survived through a mix of
cost-cutting initiatives, price reductions, and higher wages, which Henry correctly surmised
would sell more cars. In the process, he earmarked $25 million for factory expansions and
improvements making the plant flexible enough to manufacture tractors, automobiles, and a
range of other vehicles using "vertical integration" manufacturing techniques. Henry Ford's
spirit to improve efficiency and reduce production costs kept Ford Motor Company alive and
well during the hard times of the Depression. Among the top manufacturing innovations
during the Depression was the introduction of the one-piece cast V8 block by Ford. [5]

Business for Ford Motor Company trundled along during the 1930's until February 10, 1942
when by decree from the U.S. government that all civilian Ford automobile production cease
and the company's immense manufacturing facilities in Michigan and other states were brought
under the control of the War Production Board. "The same assembly line that made Ford
automobiles is now to be used for jeeps and staff cars for army officers," the press reported. [6]

Ford Motor Company poured its energies into the tools of war. Led by Henry Ford, seventyeight at the time, said to have "rolled up both sleeves" for the war effort. Henry took a track of
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land near Ypsilanti, MI called Willow Run, and ordered a mile long L-shaped plant built to
produce B-24 Liberator bombers for the military. By 1945, Henry had his production line so
efficient 70% of all B-24 bombers were made at Willow Run - no small feat given that Boeing
Co. was a dedicated aircraft manufacturer. The company also excelled at producing M-4 tanks,
parts, and engines; armored and reconnaissance cars; amphibious craft; swamp buggies; and a
wealth of other war materiel.

Unfortunately during this time of war, Edsel, Henry's son and president of Ford Motor
Company died on 26 May 1943. Henry, almost eighty years of age, resumed the tide as
president of the company. Edsel's eldest son, Henry Ford II - the "Deuce", a Naval
Lieutenant, was released from service to go back to Ford Motor Company, learn the ropes, and
eventually take over command. Henry made the "Deuce" president of the company on 21
September 1945 at only twenty-eight years old.

The company ran with the "Deuce" at the controls with Henry looking on every so often until
Henry's death on 7 April 1947. By this time, Ford Motor Company was beleaguered by an
inferior management system and other more serious problems, which Henry II tackled with
fervor. The revitalized company met the postwar economic boom with a new Ford Division
and a new car - the 1949 Ford, the first change in a Ford body since 1942 and the first change
in a chassis since 1932.

Times were changing for the United States with America's sudden postwar prosperity made a
brand-new car an attainable dream for millions. Many middle-class families had the financial
wherewithal to buy a second car. The 1950s liberated the automobile from its early utilitarian
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bonds to soar into the futuristic visions mirroring the optimism of the nation. The people who
grew up during the Depression, fought in WWII, and now figured they deserved the big twotone car with the huge V -8 engine, automatic transmission, and a boat load of chrome - big
cars that reflected big dreams. Attentions of the automotive manufacturers turned to designing
the cars people wanted - stylistic cars.

In 1955, Ford Motor Company explored an uncharted market and came up with a winner in
the new Thunderbird. The company broke all previous sales records and the "Deuce" was
named Time magazine's "Marketing Man of the Year." The next year President Dwight D.
Eisenhower signed into legislation the Interstate Highway Act earmarking public funds to build
a national grid of highways. Americans took to the roads in record numbers fueling an
economic boom through the early 1960s.

During the early 1960s, then President John F. Kennedy vowed America would be the first to
the moon, and the spirit of the space age captured the automotive manufacturers' and
consumers'imaginations. Ford led with three new cars, the 1959 Galaxie, the company's new
top-line series; the 1960 Mercury Comet, its first principle upscale compact car; the 1960 Ford
Falcon, and the 1962 Meteor. The car that took America's heart was introduced on 17 April
1964 at the New York World's Fair - the Mustang. More than a million Mustangs would be
produced before its second birthday. [7]

The winds of change were blowing though. Fun and frivolity of the 1950s and early 1960s gave
way to demands for stricter government controls on automobile hydrocarbon emissions. In
1964, California was the first state to mandate reduced amounts of nitrogen, carbon monoxide,
and lead in car exhaust. The following year, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution and Control Act
-5-

of 1965 applied the California regulations to the entire country. More anti-smog rules were
issued, such as the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970, which imposed a reduction of almost 90% in
vehicle emissions. More challenges were on the way for the automotive manufacturers. In a
speech to Ford's worldwide managers in February 1973, Henry II predicted the environment
rules would become more restrictive as the public pressure increased. He also predicted
another looming crisis - a major oil shortage. Later that year an embargo by OPEC proved

him right. Ford quickly put its great might behind the small subcompact car introduced in
1971, the Pinto.

More governmental restrictions followed making the automobile industry responsible for
energy conservation. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 instituted Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) guidelines requiring automakers to consistently improve their
vehicle's mpg metrics. Meeting these standards would not be easy for the American
automotive manufacturers who are accustomed to building large vehicles. "American
carmakers didn't want to make smallish Falcons and Valiants; they wanted to make full-size
Buicks and Fords," says Robert Casey, Curator of Transportation at Henry Ford Museum and
Greenfield Village. "It was pure economics: It didn't cost much more to make a full-size Ford
than it did to make a Falcon, but you could sell the Ford for a lot more money." [8]

But in 1978 a second oil crisis occurred and this time Japanese companies were well positioned
to take advantage of the consumer desire for smaller more fuel-efficient cars that were
dependable and affordable. Complicating matters here in the United States was a favorable
dollar-to-yen ratio, substantially lower labor costs in Japan, and soaring interest rates here in the

u.s.
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The outlook for Ford was grim. The company's U.S. sales in 1980 were half the volume of
1978. Its market share fell from 23 percent in 1977 to 17.3 percent in 1980, a year in which it
lost a staggering $1.5 billion. "Can Ford Keep Up?" was the headline on the 15 October 1979
cover of t'orbeJ magazine. This decline eventually reached 16.6 percent market share in 1981,
lowest in history. Owner loyalty also deteriorated - to 35 percent in 1981 as well. Between
1980 and 1982, the company lost $3.3 billion - a staggering 43 percent of Ford's net worth.

A difficult task lay ahead of cost management. Red Poling was given this task and in short
order he pulled one million units from production (getting back to a Lean Manufacturing
principle - waste due to over-production), laid off some 60,000 Ford employees (reducing
payroll expenses from $6.2 billion to $5.2 billion), and closed five plants (saving another $500
million). At the same time and harking back to the days of Henry Ford in the early 1930s, Ford
spent $14 billion between 1980 and 1984 on plant improvements, new products, processes,
machinery, and equipment and another $9 billion on research and development.

Red Poling explained that quality had to improve and only those plants that understood this
objective would remain open. Poling also confided that the difference between Ford and its
Japanese competitors was not the quality of workers but Ford's inferior management
philosophy, which did not emphasize continuous improvements in product quality. This
statement will become more prophetic in the next twenty years as Japanese manufacturers gain
a majority of the world market share, and take over the leaders of market share in the U.S. with
ever increasing profits.

"Quality is Job 1" now permeated the culture at Ford facilities all over the world. By the first
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quarter of 1983, Ford was profitable both at home and overseas for the first time in the past
sixteen quarters; by the end of the year, Ford was the car sales leader in all of Europe for the
first time in its history. The hard work and benefits were starting to payoff and a new ground
breaking design was on the board, the new Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable. Ford had
undertaken long-term planning of a kind never before seen in the automobile industry. The
Taurus team contracted outside experts in ergonomics, insurance, and car repair to offer their
specialized advice and criticism, of which many they implemented. Ford engineers literally tore
apart hundreds of cars sold by competitors, a process called "reverse engineering," to learn
others' best practices firsthand. The team brought the program in under budget realizing an
impressive 11 percent return on investment. The company's pretax earnings in 1986 were
better than GM's for the first time since 1924, and the next year, Ford's stock price climbed an
astonishing 76 percent from its 1986 high.

In the mid-1980s, Ford continued to evolve, embarking on an ambitious agenda to acquire
large fmancial services companies. Its objective was twofold: to offset the cyclical nature of the
automotive business and to provide Ford's customer base with a broad range of financial
services products. By the year 2000, outside tiers of suppliers now contributed the lion's share
of parts used in Ford vehicles. In 1995, the head of Ford Motor Company, Alex Trotman,
adopted another endeavor, to cut costs, boost productivity, and grow the bottom line - Ford
2000.

The Ford 2000 strategy is to have global product teams create cars that would be sold around
the world, thereby reducing waste and duplication of effort. A more efficient, leaner company
would result and provide more autonomy to branch managers. The goal of a more nimble
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international company embracing teamwork, new technology, and a worldwide outlook - one
far less bureaucratic and insular - remained the same. A new CEO of Ford,Jac Nasser, put the
Ford 2000 initiative aside in favor of a new strategy, BLI - Business Leadership Initiative.

The latest initiative to make the rounds at Ford Motor Company is "Way Forward". "Way
Forward" is an innovation initiative to set the direction of Ford Motor Company onto a
profitable path. According to William Clay Ford, Jr., CEO of Ford Motor Company,
"Innovation is going to be the compass by which this Company sets its direction. Innovative
answers need to be found for every aspect of our business, from product development and
manufacturing to human resources and finance. Not everyone will have the ideas that we need,
but everyone can support and help implement needed innovation." [9]

Why such an exhausting description of Ford Motor Company's history? To point out the fact
that since 1932, there has been no significant innovation or invention in manufacturing for
Ford Motor Company. Henry Ford was the last true leader at Ford who fully understood
manufacturing and the principles of efficiency that would later become known as, "Lean
Manufacturing". The following is an excerpt regarding Henry's amazing consciousness of
manufacturing principles:

"Henry fought back with another new car, the pioneering Ford V-8, introduced in 1932. Other
carmakers had made eight-cylinder engines before, but they were heavy and expensive, causing
many to focus instead on six-cylinder engines. Henry disliked six-cylinder motors and always
insisted that engines should be made only with four, eight, or sixteen cylinders. Once, upon
hearing that his engineers had devised a six-cylinder engine without his knowledge, he was so
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infuriated that he took an axe to it.
Henry had a better idea - a one-piece V8 engine block that would be lighter in weight and less
expensive to make. There was only one hitch: the casting technology to manufacture a single
V8 engine didn't exist. That didn't stop Henry. He and a group of handpicked engineers set
up shop in 1931 in Thomas Edison's old Fort Myers laboratory, which had been moved to the
grounds of Greenfield Village in Dearborn, to find the solutions.
"Mr. Ford kept everybody away from [the project]," Emil Zoerlin, and electrical engineer on
the project, said in his reminiscences. "As far as I know, Charlie Sorensen didn't know about it,
[and] I don't know whether Edsel was aware. The original concept of the V8 was Mr. Ford's.
[He] came in two or three times a day [and] was vitally interested in a one-piece casting of the
cylinder block. It had to be one-piece, defmitely." [10]

As Henry Ford was getting up in years, he started to turn control of Ford Motor Company over
to his son, and later his grandson, Henry Ford II. But none of them could match Henry's
prowess of manufacturing principles. In 1946 manufacturing gave way to "Modern Business
Strategies" as the Deuce, Henry Ford II, hired 10 former USAAF officers, nick-named the
"Whiz Kids", who would bring principles of modern management to the company. Thus was
lost the emphasis on efficient manufacturing techniques and reduction of waste efforts.

General Ford Corporate Tirneline: Appendix A
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B - What is Lean Manufacturing?

"Save ten steps a day for each of twelve thousand employees," Henry [Ford] said, "and you
will have saved fifty miles of wasted motion and misspent energy." [11]

When you ask, "What is the Toyota Production System?" 80 percent of people will answer "A
Kanban System", 15 percent will answer "A production system", and only 5 percent who
understand the basic principle will answer "A system for the absolute elimination of waste."
(Shingo, 1989) [12]

The Toyota Production System (TPS) is generally accepted as the basis for manufacturing
principles known as Lean Manufacturing. Therefore, this thesis will concentrate most on TPS
as a guide to Lean Manufacturing and a comparison to Ford Motor Company. However,
understanding the basic philosophy of TPS is central to understanding what Lean
Manufacturing is all about. This thesis uses TPS and Lean Manufacturing synonymously
though there are some differences.

Lean manufacturing embraces a philosophy of excellence that includes the elimination of
waste or non-value-added activities while adjusting the production flow of the product
according to customer demand.

It uses the building blocks of: standardized work, workplace organization, visual controls,
effective plant layout, and quality at the source, batch reduction, teams, customer demandbased manufacturing, point-of-use storage, quick changeover (SMED), one-piece flow, cellular
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manufacturing, and takt time.

Lean manufacturing also applies the modern elements and technologies of scrap reduction,
process improvements in machining and tool selection as well as material selection, set-up
reduction, Just-In-Time, Kaizan, world-class manufacturing, synchronous manufacturing, and
inventory management.

In a paper prepared by The Kentucky Way partnership between the University of Kentucky
and Toyota, the group outlines "The Lean Organization": [13]

The lean organization ...
1

Designs its products and aligns every step in its operations to create the highest value
for its customers.

2

Truly believes its people are its most important asset and creates a work environment
that promotes respect, job satisfaction and meaningful contribution.

3

Is simultaneously stable and flexible.

4

Flows work so that problems are immediately visible and then has systems in place to
fix them fast and permanendy.

5

Assesses costs accurately, fully recognizing systems and lifecycle impacts of decisions.

6

Distributes power across the organization but maintains strategic focus and control
through clear charters of responsibility, defmition of organizational roles, and
communication of appropriate organizational goals.

7

Relies on an evolutional use of standards to rapidly improve its methodologies, role
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definitions, and policy effectiveness while maintaining high levels of control.
8

Builds control into the system through structural simplification and does not succumb
to the false promises of superimposed control through information systems.

9

Is skillful at using the key tools such as visual controls, standardized work, mistake
proofmg, and setup reduction, but knows that these exist simply to create the requisite
structure and sustain control of lean operations; they are not at the heart of lean
production.

10 Engages everyone as a knowledge worker and employs the lean work system -- a
sophisticated system involving local work ownership and empowerment, strategic
work focus, evolutionary standards, and learning-focused improvement strategies -- to
rapidly kaizen methodologies for tremendous gains in efficiency, quality, and control.
11 Uses appropriate accounting and performance measurement systems that provide
rapid feedback, motivates true system-level performance improvement, maintain
appropriate focus on the long term, and take advantage of the control that exists
through simplification of the system.
12 Relies on managers who know the work, who are in touch with the work through
direct presence and keen observation, who get their hands dirty, who support the
work, who develop their people, and have learned how to lead their teams.
13 Recognizes that competition occurs at the level of the extended-enterprise value
stream and builds that value stream through strong partnerships with its suppliers and
customers.

14 Is good, good to its customers, good to its people, and good to society. It ends up
being very highly rewarded for that.
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The Toyota Production System evolved from the historic manufacturing system developed by
Henry Ford. Among the distinguishing elements of Ford's system, all of which still can be
seen today in any modern automobile plant:
1

A conveyor belt - work came to the workers.

2

Division of labor - workers handled only single steps in the assembly sequence.

3

Integrated supply chain - Ford kept each process in the production sequence supplied
with all the parts and materials needed in the process.

A passage from the Toyota Motor Manufacturing employee's handbook, "The Toyota
Production System":
"Henry Ford's manufacturing system thus provided the historical and technological
foundations for the Toyota Production System. But circumstances in Japan provided the
opportunity for some crucial improvements on Ford's system.
To begin with, production volumes in postwar Japan were miniscule compared with
automotive output in the West. Those small production volumes did not allow Japanese
automakers the luxury of using specialized equipment for each model. Nor did they allow for
stocking huge inventories of parts.
Automakers in Japan thus needed to develop flexible methods for adapting the same machines
to different vehicle models. And they needed to fInd ways to ensure reliable supplies of
needed parts and materials without maintaining big inventories." [14]
What are the Toyota Production System's cornerstone ideologies?
1 Just-In-Time (JIT) production
o

Doing it all for the Customer
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2

o

Leveled production

o

Pull system

o

Continuous-flow processing

o

Takt time

o

Multi-skilled operators

Jidoka
o

3

Building Quality into the production process

Standardized Work and Kaizen
o

Standardized Work: the Basis for Kaizen

o

Kaizen: the Lifeblood of Standardized Work

Within this thesis rhetoric of the Introduction, Lean Manufacturing is fIrst and above all about
the recognition and reduction of wastes typically viewed as - Over Production, Over
Processing, Inventory, Waiting, Correction, Conveyance, and Motion. The starting line of
Lean Manufacturing is not always obvious to most engineers and managers alike, but Lean
principles start with the customer base.

C - A New Vision for Ford Motor Company - The Way Forward Plan

Announced on 23 January 2006, William Clay Ford, Jr. introduced the new President of the
Americas, Mark Fields, and Mr. Fields' new direction to right the failing company. The plan
Mr. Fields introduced: "The Way Forward".
According to Mark Fields, the success of Ford Motor Company hinges on three priorities:
1

Creating a team that knows how to win
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2

Developing a Way Forward plan that shows us how to win

3

Developing with speed to help us win quickly

Figure 1- The Way Forward Plan
The complete announcement is listed in Appendix B.

Summary of the Way Forward plan:
Comprehensive North American "Way Forward" plan focuses every part of the business on
the customer - to build stronger Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brands, a strengthened product
lineup and far greater quality, competitive costs and improved productivity.
•

Product investments will result in new vehicles in new segments to reach more
customers - including small cars and more crossovers - while maintaining Ford's truck
leadership.

•

Ford is committed to stabilizing its U.S. market share in the near term.

•

Competitive cost structure includes net material cost reductions of at least $6 billion by
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2010.
•

Productivity improvements leverage the company's global product development scale
and lean and flexible manufacturing system to introduce more products faster.

•

Straight forward vehicle pricing will continue to be introduced with new models.

•

North American capacity is realigned to match demand - with 14 manufacturing
facilities to be idled - resulting in significant cost savings and reduced employment of
25,000-30,000.

•

Salary-related costs are being cut 10 percent in North America with the previously
announced reduction of the equivalent of 4,000 salaried positions by the end of the
first quarter. In addition, the company's officer ranks are being reduced 12 percent by
the end of the first quarter.

•

Ford is planning a new low-cost manufacturing site for the future.

•

North American automotive profitability is achieved no later than 2008.

•

Beginning in 2006, Ford Motor Company will no longer provide earnings guidanceto keep the company and investors focused on one goal: sustainable profitability over
time in all regions.
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D - Problem Statement:
The objective of this thesis is to provide a unique philosophy and structure as given in the
"Process to Sustained Success" diagram to form the basis for re-innovating Ford Motor
Company to continued profitability and continuous improvement.

This thesis doesn't intend to address every detail of Lean Manufacturing concepts and the
application of specific techniques toward Ford Motor Company's manufacturing processes,
but to develop the mindset and philosophy needed to confront the brutal reality that Ford's
manufacturing and product development systems need to evolve from its heritage.

Through out the historical review of Ford Motor Company one thing became apparent in this
research - Ford Motor Company lacks a structured and standardized approach to
manufacturing continuous improvement prohibiting the re-innovation to a lean enterprise and
direct competition with Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corporation. Can Ford achieve
sustained success implementing "The Way Forward" plan, or does "The Way Forward" plan
need to incorporate the "Process to Sustained Success" to meet Ford's long-term goals? The
benchmark company for comparison is Toyota Motor Manufacturing Company.

E - Scope of Thesis:

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I gives an initial introduction to the history of
Ford Motor Company, and Lean Manufacturing principles. Chapter II will focus on the
current operations and structure at Ford Motor Company based on the steps of the "Process
to Sustained Success". Chapter III, using the same steps of the "Process to Sustained
Success", outlines proposed changes in the philosophy, management, engineering, and
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manufacturing structure to improve Ford Motor Company seeking long-term profitability.
Many comparisons and analogies will be made with Toyota Motor Manufacturing Company.
Chapter IV presents a literature review of great leadership and managerial philosophy and
techniques, and how they should be applied to Ford Motor Company. Additionally, it will
take us through the 5 Why's of how Ford came to be in the shape it's in. Chapter V provides
conclusions and recommendations on potential areas for further study.
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Chapter II: Process to Sustained Success - Current State ofFord Motor Company

A. Level Scheduling:
A level schedule starts with the customer, and is an integral and important factor in deciding
production rates and volumes for each vehicle line. The Japanese call Level Scheduling,

Heijunka, which sequences orders in a repetitive pattern, and smoothing the day-to-day
variations in total orders to correspond to long-term demand. The strategic implications are
vast regarding vehicle inventory levels, raw material purchases, manufacturing tempo, and
supplier daily production schedule.

Level Scheduling is accomplished by taking the total orders per product family for a time
period (e.g. a month), and then create a schedule and build rate. At Ford Motor Company,
this step is not properly accomplished and induces many wastes including the worst - Over
Production, and forces Ford's manufacturing systems to "Push" instead of the customer
demand "Pull System".

The frustration of Ford's Dealership network over this system is on a steady rise. The system
works as such: A dealership receives vehicles based on vehicle line allocations; which are
determined on the sales volume of a particular dealership. As an example, Stuart Powell Ford
in Danville, KY is allotted only one Mustang GT per month even though they have on
average three customer orders per month. Ford Motor Company's Marketing group is
reluctant to provide Stuart Powell's Ford Dealership with more Mustang GT allocations
because Stuart Powell's vehicle sales on vehicle lines such as the Explorer, Freestar, and
Freestyle are below Ford :Y(otor Company's expectations. The compromises and dealings
between Ford Motor Company and Stuart Powell Ford take place with Ford stating that if
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Stuart Powell takes delivery of three more Explorers then they will receive an extra Mustang
GT allocation. This action of "packaging" in turn induces a response by Stuart Powell Ford to
"push" vehicles onto the customers, and typically with Ford Motor Company having to
provide cosdy incentives to move these products. Failure to sell more Explorers, Freestars, or
Freestyles forces Ford Motor Company to idle manufacturing facilities due the Marketing and
Sales down-weeks. Last year, Louisville Assembly Plant (LAP), was shut down for a total of
seven weeks due to slumping sales. St. Louis Assembly Plant (SLAP, another plant that
produced the Explorer and Mountaineer) ran at only 25% capacity. And as of 8 March 2006,
St. Louis Assembly Plant was permanendy idled. [15]

Ford Motor Company's Marketing and Sales division attempts to balance customer desires for
certain vehicle lines while keeping the manufacturing facilities operational at a given
production rate. Due to the inflexibility of most of Ford's manufacturing facilities, the
mentioned scenario induces a "push" system instead of a "pull" system where a manufacturer
has the flexibility to produce to customer demand. Downtime in 2005 for LAP and SLAP are
also attributed gready in part to the inability to adjust Takt time, or production tempo to
decrease or increase the rate of production based on customer demand. The ability to adjust
Takt time starts with standardizing work elements and will be discussed in the next chapter
dealing with a proposed system.

Again, Level Scheduling starts with the customer, but has profound affects on the
manufacturing system and quality level of Ford Motor Company's supplier base. The current
build complexity for the Ford Explorer/Mountaineer/Sport Trac built at L'\P is over 14,000
different combinations. Most of the complexity is manageable, with only 25 parts brought
into the plant ILVS. However, the main purpose of Level Scheduling is to smooth daily
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fluctuating production volume and mix requirements for the fInal manufacturing facility and
the supplier base for a predetermined period of time to produce and deliver the same part
number in the same volume and mix. Table 1 shows a snap shot of a typical production
schedule at LAP (data taken 28 March 2006 at the Louisville Assembly Plant):

ISoo. 100 [f( IYI

ENI ilNE

:QJ"lR

GRAIE

i~

~,4'
MOLNT,Il,lt-I ER

EXPlOREF

8_
=
Blpl""

SP<X! Tlac

Iiiiiii

- \.II

\,6

IXLS

1m

Ell

)(

LID ICo""""ce IW>lJry

rilU

)(

iB

WiD

~;"f"";:'
,,~

~

I'!lliJ61I

J\

1;'_

)(

1m

~

IIIIIIIIIII

I'!lliJ61I

ItiD

i f il! IHE Ij t J
)(

x

x

• •

ll::.

•

-r- -r- -

-- -- --

--

)(

)(

~\\iic.e':4+

iI£U

~

I

1-

r- r- r- -

IE -

1m

Im

oJ!

)(

r- r- r~
r-

lila

)(

illik>¥;

-

1-1-- -

1-- 1-- -

B_

x

ro

j

IIIIIIIIIII

[:o:·x o'

IdlJidliCH

'8

~ 'i

I~ ~

- •

- -- -.. ..
- -_0

)(

·:·5~RMj{;]

LTD

MIn IS

Eo

iB

)(

~
~
- _:
-

-XLT

- -- -d%!!IE.'lilli

LSi(

ISPoR1 TRAC

-

•

Ir-rr-r'--'--

Table 1 - Example of typical LAP build schedule
Noticeable in the table above, neither the Body Type nor the engine, in order of precedence
when determining build schedule, are completely balanced in a set pattern. Next in the order
of precedence are trim level or Grade, and then color.
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From a supplier base perspective, the schedule of parts to ship to the manufacturing facility is
critical for day-to-day scheduling of dies in a press and maintenance. The example below
shows three weeks of shipping orders for hood components shipped from an outside supplier
to the Louisville Assembly Plant. The hood inners and outers are for the Explorer, and are
hemmed one-to-one at the assembly plant.
Date
Shipped
10-Apr-06
11-Apr-06
12-Apr-06
13-Apr-06
18-Apr-06
19-Apr-06
20-Apr-06
21-Apr-06
24-Apr-06
25-Apr-06
26-Apr-06
27-Apr-06
28-Apr-06
1-May-06
2-May-06
3-May-06
4-May-06
7-May-06
8-May-06
9-May-06
10-May-06
11-May-06

# Hood Inners Ship~ed to LAP

# Hood Outers Shipped to LAP

1040
1560
520
520
1040
1040
1040
1040
1040
1040
1040
1040
1040
1040
1560
1040
520
1040
520
1560

640
1320
1040
680
1000
1000
1000
1320
1000
1000
1320
1000
1000
1720
1320
960
714
360
1360
320
2000

2080

1320

0

Table 2 - Sample Hood Component Shipping Schedule
The hood components shipped in on a daily basis fluctuates from a day-to-day and
component-to-component level, and don't meet the daily production schedule of 1138 units
produced per day.

Level Scheduling an important factor in supplier quality.

Ford provides suppliers with a

confIrmed production schedule for a set time period, but does not provide a level daily
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production schedule. Therefore, a supplier's production requirement in part volume and mix
may vary dramatically from day to day. In the example above, hood inners and outers are
paired one for one and assembled to create one complete hood. The daily volume rates are
significantly different between hood components.

In order to meet Ford's t1uctuating daily production volume and mix requirements, a typical
supplier will adjust their manufacturing process in the following ways:
1

Increase/decrease production run time

2

Increase/ decrease production cycle time

3

Add/subtract workers from process line

4

Increase/decrease scheduled changeovers

5

Cancel/delay scheduled tooling/equipment maintenance

6

Cancel/delay scheduled personnel training & development

7

Bypass structured problem solving

8

Increase/ decrease downstream supplier production requirements

All of these actions represent deviations from a standard and result in manufacturing process
instability and inconsistent part quality.

Flexible manufacturing is difficult to obtained without practicing the first step of Heijunka;
which leads to improving and developing standardization methods.
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B. Standardization:

Without a Standard - You don't have a problem! Additionally, a Problem is a Deviation from
a Standard!

A level schedule provided by Ford Motor Company to its' own manufacturing facilities and
suppliers alike allow the development and execution to sustain manufacturing processes based
on Standardization. Achieving a level schedule doesn't make a lean system, but starts and
promotes the reduction of waste enabling the manufacturing system with the mentality of lean
concepts.

Taiichi Ohno was the man who did the most to structure the Toyota Production System (IPS)
as an integrated framework. Mr. Ohno experimented with various ways of setting up
equipment to produce items in a timely manner much like Ford Motor Company's founder,
Henry Ford. But he got a whole new perspective on just-in-time production when he visited
the United States in 1956. Ohno went to the United States to visit automotive plants, but his
most important discovery was the U.S. supermarket. He marveled at the way customers chose
exactly what they wanted and in the quantities they wanted. Ohno admired the way the
supermarkets supplied merchandise in a simple, efficient, and timely manner.

Ohno describes TPS in terms of a supermarket. Each production line arrayed its diverse
output for the following line to choose from, like merchandise on supermarket shelves. Each
line became the customer for the preceding line, and a supermarket for the following line.
The following line would choose those items needed and only those items, and the preceding
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line would produce only the replacement items for the ones the following line had selected.

This format is a Pull System, driven by the needs of the following lines. It contrasts with
conventional Push Systems, which are driven by the output of the preceding lines. Going

back to our level scheduling scenario with the dealerships, Ford Motor Company's current
system is still the epitome of a Push System. Dealerships are often forced to push vehicles
even though customer demand isn't there.

The beautiful supermarket concept also promotes standardization in marketing, packaging,
shipping, and production of the product to affect the lowest costs and highest profits. Cost
reductions are key and it starts with leaning the production system of wastes - the greatest
being over-production.

A quick review of Ford's Louisville Assembly Plant's Body Shop illustrates a push system with
much waste in over production, conveyance, and waiting. Illustrating this example again is the
hood components after hemming into an assembled hood. The management at Louisville
Assembly Plant chooses to hold around 1200 hoods in storage between the hood assembly
line and hood install on the manufacturing line:
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Figure 2 - Assembled Hoods in racks awaiting installation
The Hood Line is capable of running 110 hoods per hour compared with the vehicle assembly
line of 80 jobs per hour. This over-speed of the Hood Line leads to the greatest waste noted
in the picture above - Over-Production; which leads to the other wastes of Inventory and
extra Material Conveyance to move to storage then to production. Keeping a balance of
hoods near 1200 per day costs Louisville Assembly Plant around $81,600 per week in
adclitional inventory carrying costs, and jeoparclizes the abiliry to move assembled hoods in a
First in - First out, queue, fashion. If stock is not rotated in a standarclized manner, the ability
to problem solve a defect is very clifficult if the team doesn't have the when, where, and why a
defect occurred.

Understanding a defect and a defect definition starts with the process that an operator has to
perform. Ford Motor Company attempts to standarclize manufacturing processes as outlined
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in the process database, GSPAS, across the company globally. One of the failures of the
system, though, is the lack of training and consistency among process sheet writers. An
example of inconsistent process writing:

Element 010 - OBTAIN FENDER FROM RACK
Element 020 - OBTAIN FOUR SCREWS
Element 030 - HANDSTART FOUR SCREWS
Element 040 - TIGHTEN FOUR SCREWS

As compared to this incorrect version:
Element 010 - OBTAIN FENDER FROM RACK
Element 020 - OBTAIN FOUR SCREWS
Element 030 - HANDSTART FOUR SCREWS
Element 040 - OBTAIN NUT RUNNER
Element 050 - SECURE FOUR SCREWS

What's the importance of a verb? Ford's GSPAS system calculates MODAPTS , MODular
Arrangement of Predetermined Time Standards, to utilize as a basis for operator work
instructions. In the verb "TIGHTEN" MODAPTS calculates the time for an operator to
retrieve nut-runner, position nut-runner to screw, trigger nut-runner till torque, and aside nutrunner. In the second series of instructions, Element 040 is redundant and inaccurate on two
occasions. First, the verb "OBTAIN" is to procure a part not a tool. Secondly, MODAPTS
calculates time from the verb "SECURE" to retrieve nut-runner, position screw to nut-runner,
position nut-runner and screw to joint, trigger nut-runner till torque, and aside nut-runner.
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Basically, one of the most common mistakes in process writing is using incorrect verbs. In the
example above, if the verb "HANDSTART" is used due to a cross-threading problem, then
the verb "TIGHTEN" must be used - "SECURE" cannot be used in this example. The verb
"SECURE" is used when a bolt, nut, or screw is placed to the driving implement of the nutrunner and shot in the joint without hand starting ftrst (most operations are completed using
"SECURE"). Therefore, a quick audit of many process sheets will show a lack of training and
inconsistent process writing by the Manufacturing Engineering staff.

Standardization of process sheets are important in the creation of Operator Instruction Sheets
(OIS); which were initially hand-written by operators themselves, but proved so unstandardized in execution and verbiage to the actual work performed as seen in Figure 3. The
new system in place is based directly off the GSPAS process sheets making standardization of
language and format critical to quality. The problem: since work elements are not
standardized within Ford, OIS sheets attempt to accomplish this without the philosophy to
support a lean mentality and continuous improvement.
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Figure 3 - Assembler written Operator Instruction Sheet from Louisville Assembly
Plant
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Ensuring correct verbs within process sheets is an absolute must if improvements in
"Standardized Work Elements" can ever happen at Ford Motor Company. The current
system to "Balance a Line" is the old tried and true stopwatch. The problem of the stopwatch
is that it doesn't take into account the level of effort of a particular element, but based on how
fast one worker completes the designated tasks and then attempts to set a standard based this
worker. The real problem comes into play when a "ringer" is positioned on a job to set up a
job a fast rate, then pulled from the job after a period of time causing those positioned on the
job afterward to struggle causing quality defects and through-put concerns. MODAPTS is not
subjective and takes the stopwatch out of the calculation of production standards, improving
employee relations while adding objectivity to standards. No longer will you discuss how fast a
particular person is working during a time study, because MODAPTS requires no
performance rating.

Unfortunately, the current system uses performance rated stopwatch evaluations to set up jobs
making the job to standardize work elements a virtual impossibility. Without creating
standardized work elements the results are manufacturing process instabilities and inconsistent
part quality. Strict adherence to process standards promotes structured problem solving and
allows operators and suppliers alike to readily identify variations in the process and parts.
With a lack of standards, or a culture that commonly promotes deviations from a standard, a
supplier cannot easily control process stability or part quality.
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C. Structured Problem Solving:

A problem is a deviation from a standard! Customer Satisfaction improvements mean the
reduction or elimination of problems. To accomplish elimination of problems, Structured
Problem Solving events must occur. The current methodologies to structured problem
solving involve the use of specialized training with 6Sigma by certified Black Belts and Green
Belts, and the Giobal8D (eight disciplines) process. Louisville Assembly Plant employs four
full-time Green Belts to assist in problem resolution. The Green Belt positions are an added
job classification to the UAW-Ford agreement bringing the total number of unskilled
classifications to fourteen. This is an important fact emphasizing UAW core values that an
assembler's job is to assemble parts, not problem solve. Problem solving is then left to the
classification of the Green Belts.

Personnel with the job classification of Inspector are charged to find problems as seen in
Figure 4. However, there are many instances where Ford implements poka-yoke devices or
systems into the process, especially if they are critical. Examples: correct door hinges, DC
nut-runners with feedback tied to the manufacturing line, and vision systems inspecting for
the correct part or attribute.

However, to be truly lean and employ good structured problem solving techniques, inspection
must occur at the operation - called informative inspection.
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PROCESS MAP:
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Figure 4 - Current State Process Map
In this process, installation of the Center High Mount Stop Light (CHMSL) is inspected at the
end of the Chassis Line and in Pre-Delivery with the installation process occurring several

hours prior in the Trim Area and far from the point of operation.

- 33-

This type of inspection is called Judgment Inspection and engages in the practice of statistical
quality control (SQC) with inputs by the inspectors into a computerized tracking system.
Unfortunately, only the defect is tracked, but not what causes the defect. For this, a Black Belt
or Green Belt is called in to assess and correct the problem. This system is hardly lean
resulting in the wastes of motion, correction, and over processing. Again, this type of
inspection does not occur at the operation where the defect can readily be seen and a
corrective action or containment performed prior to advancing to the next operation. The
end effect is quality defects that go unnoticed end up at the customer raising warranty costs
and decreasing customer satisfaction.

Using the assembled hood example again, the biggest in-plant containment actions for LAP's
Body Shop are hood fit problems. Hood fit issues are attributed to several factors: hood inner
shape and hood outer trim flange lengths, assembled hood storage methodology and storage
time. There are basically four distinct points around the hood at the four corners that are
deemed critical to customer satisfaction. Understanding the factors through Structured
Problem Solving techniques is essential in to improving customer satisfaction. The analysis is
discussed in the next section.

D. Customer Satisfaction:
Customer satisfaction is critical to the end goal of increasing profits. Maintaining customer
satisfaction is an absolute must in this competitive world market; which gives no advantages to
new vehicles. The demanding consumer base expects world-class quality right from the gate.
Unfortunately, Ford Motor Company lags far behind its competitors from an initial launch
Global Quality Reporting System survey shown in Figure 5.
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GQRS U.S. THINGS-GONE-WRONG PER THOUSAND @ 3 MONTHS-IN-SERVICE
2005 FORDILINCOLNIMERCURY NEW LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE

Significant Variability for New Launch Vehicle Petformance
2265

FI..M 1831
Avg.
Industry 1638 •

Avg.

Figure 5 - GQRS TGW /1000 for new Launch Vehicle Performance 2005
Ford Lincoln Mercury (FLM) is almost 400 TGW /1000 worse than the class leaders Toyota
and Honda.
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Figure 6 - GQRS TGW /1000 Five-Year Trend Chart
This figure shows that in the last five years, Ford Motor Company has made approximately
500 TGW /1000 improvement, but still lags significantly behind its competitors.

The lack of significant improvement to keep pace with industry leaders Toyota and Honda,
according to Anne Stevens, Executive VP, The Americas, Ford Motor Company [16]:

Reality on Quality
1

Key to our products' success in the marketplace is competitive quality:
o

Some improvements have been made, but Ford still lags the competition
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o

Our competitors have the same processes we do - the difference is their execution
strategy

2

Execution is the key to our success

Practices and Behaviors Resulting in our Current State
1

Lack of focus on the containment of issues and the implementation of permanent
corrective actions on things that matter most to the customer

2

Absence of cross-functional alignment on top customer driven concerns

3

Lack of process discipline, accountability, and enablers in place to deliver vehicles that
are better than out-going models

4

We rely on customers to ftnd issues - instead of utilizing less costly internal methods

The two most important bullet points from Anne Stevens are that our competitors' execution
strategy is different, and a lack of process discipline. In the next chapter, a "5 Why" drill
down will help explain the lack of manufacturing continuous improvement, and highlight why
the Japanese automakers are enjoying their current day advantage.
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E. Profitability:
Ford Motor Company is experiencing profitability problems in its North American
Automotive Operations for the last several years. For 2005, Ford's North America automotive
operations reported a pre-tax loss of $1.6 billion. The full report is outlined in Appendix D.
A quick review oflast year's stock market value trend, Figure 7, shows an unsustainable trend
or any form of improvement, and this can be attributed to lack of customer satisfaction and
consumer confidence in the real or perceived quality of Ford Motor Company's products.
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- 38-

Splits: ...
as of 27-Mar-2006
40
30

20
10

...

80

~60
o
::: 40

.....

i: 20

O~__~~""~~~~~~MM~~~~.
Copyright 2006 Yahoo! Inc.
http://finance.yahoo.com/

Figure 8 - Ford Motor Company's 30 year Stock Valuation Trend Chart

Higher stock price allows a company more capital to work with to invest in research and
development, new products, or improving manufacturing facilities to a leaner system. Most of
Ford's assembly plants are in need of significant capital investments to update the
manufacturing equipment to truly flexible systems. Current manufacturing systems are
capable of only building one basic model with brand variations, i.e. Explorer and Mountaineer.
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Chapter III: Process to Sustained Success - The Proposal
A. Profitability:
Why are we here? Only one answer exists - To Make Money. There is no other altruistic
point being in business. Understanding how an enterprise becomes more profitable a review
of the industry leader's financial performance as a comparison to Ford Motor Company's
performance is the first step.
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Figure 9 - One Year Trend Stock Price Valuation Comparison - Ford to Toyota
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Figure 10 - Ten Year Trend Stock Price Valuation Comparison - Ford to Toyota
The stock price gap between Ford and Toyota increased dramatically in the last five years
because of Toyota's adoption of TPS or lean manufacturing principles through necessity over
50 years ago. Over the last 50 years, Toyota has nurtured its Toyota Production System in the
elimination of waste and thereby raising quality. Improving quality and keeping costs down
through waste elimination produces greater customer satisfaction and profits. The stock price
trend chart in Figure 10 is an outcome and reward the illustrates Toyota's continuous
improvements, while at the same time demonstrating Ford's lack of continuous improvement
and sustainability in customer satisfaction measured by lost stock price.
The best way to accomplish this is by implementing a total cost accounting strategy and
getting away from the "Task" based strategy that doesn't promote continuous improvements
in quality.

The philosophy that elimination of all wastes is essential to all business and

manufacturing decisions is imperative to increasing customer satisfaction and greater profit
returns.
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B. Customer Satisfaction:
To improve the business bottom line give customers the products they want with the quality
they expect at reasonable costs delivered on time. Companies that are more efficient than
their competitors in providing customers with high-quality goods and services will thrive.
Those that are less efficient than their competitors will parish. The globalization of markets
means customers don't have to accept anything less.

Toyota has been able to sustain its increasing trend in share value, customer satisfaction, and
automotive market share. By fostering TPS over the last 50 years, "Management and labor
have developed an intrinsic trust between each other, which has only deepened over the years.
Management has rewarded employees for productivity gains with improved compensation and
working conditions. Employees have taken the initiative in activities for raising efficiency and
otherwise enhancing the company's competitiveness." [17] In addition, Toyota understands
the fundamental principle for reliability is to avoid changing the conditions of a good design.
Example: my wife's 1993 Toyota Camry has the exact same steering wheel, cruise control
system, window and door lock controls, door handles, and park brake lever to name a few
items as Toyota's 2006 4Runner. Take a good design, keep it, and apply kaizen along the way.

Ford has not been able to make that leap in improvements to keep up with the competition.
According to Anne Stevens' point shared in the last chapter, "Our competitors have the same
processes we do - the difference is their execution strategy." To understand how Ford must
improve look at Ford's history and ask the Five Why's.

Why was Ford dominant in the early 1900's? Henry Ford's emphasis was on manufacturing
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efficiency.

Why the lack of continuous improvement? Focus shift to product development and lost
emphasis on manufacturing continuous improvements.

Why the shift to product development? The adoption of Modem Business Principles
by Ford's management team focused the philosophy to product development.

Why adopt "Modem Business Principles"? At the time, Ford's accounting system
was in shambles and needed a shake up with good cost accounting.
Fortunately, the government made this an easier task by controlling the price
of steel.

In addition, after WWII, attention turned to designing the cars

people wanted - stylistic cars and in large quantities.

Why develop stylistic cars in large quantities? At the time, American's demand
was over-whelming for vehicles as new interstates were built, and the
United States expanded to sub-division life styles.

At the same time,

there was no outside competition since WWII decimated most of
Germany and Japan's manufacturing facilities.

Japan in contrast after WWII had miniscule production volumes per model, which did not
allow Japanese automakers the luxury of using specialized equipment for each model. Nor did
they allow stocking huge inventories of parts. In essence, Japanese automakers had to be lean
to survive. To survive, Toyota developed its' Toyota Production System and implemented it
across all functions in its company starting with its manufacturing system over to product
development good design reviews that emphasize discovery of undetected problems caused by
intentional or incidental changes.
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The Toyota Production System supports productivity gams by highlighting waste and
engenders quality gains by illuminating problems when and where they occur. In other words,
by moving from Judgment Inspection to Informative Inspection - inspection at the process quality and customer satisfaction gains are made.
Ford concentrated more on mass production of stylistic vehicle that were more works of art at
times, but lacked manufacturing techniques

to continuously improve a design or

manufacturing process. This attitude still exists today at Ford Motor Company.

C. Structured Problem Solving:
To give customers what they want and expect, we must identify and understand variations in
our processes and parts and use structured problem solving events to eliminate problems and
waste.

At Ford and Toyota alike, machines are equipped to detect production problems and shut
down immediately when one occurs, indicating where and what type of problem it is on a
marquee board or other display. According to Shingo Shigeo, "At Toyota, however, the most
important issue is not how quickly personnel are alerted to a problem, but what solutions are
implemented." [18]

Revisiting the hood fit problem at Ford's Louisville Assembly Plant, four factors contribute to
the degradation of hood quality during the process: Hood inner shape, hood outer flange
length, storage method, and storage time. Using these factors in a Structured Problem Solving
technique called Design of Experiments (DOE), we are able to find which factors are critical,
and the interactions between the factors given the response variable of hood deflection at
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customer defmed specific points around the hood:
dY

(Hood Deflection)

= F(X) = function of (1\ = Inner Shape, B = Outer ('lange, C = Storage Time, & D=Storagc Method)

Factors:
• A - Inner Panel Shape at rear comers (current vs. lmm above nominal)
• B - Outer Panel Flange Length (current vs. 3mm short)
• C - Storage Time (panels measured within 1Smin of hemming vs. 24hr hold)
• D - Storage Method (panels stored Vertically vs. Horizontally)

-- --

Figure 11: 2006 Explorer Hood Significant Characteristics for Quality

In Figure 11, points 3, 9, 23, and 30 around the hood are deemed the most critical to customer
satisfaction based on warranty analysis and other quality indicators such as JD Powers report
and Global Quality Reporting System (GQRS) for craftsmanship. Evaluating around points 3,
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9,23, and 30 for this exercise and using a 4 factor, 2 level DOE the results are computed using
Minitab:
Response is sheet metal deflection from nominal on hood Pt a3:
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Figure 12: DOE results for Pt a3 around 2006 Explorer Hood
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Response is sheet metal deflection from nominal on hood Pt a9
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Figure 13: DOE results for Pt a9 around 2006 Explorer Hood
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1mm High

Response is sheet metal deflection from nominal on hood Pt a23

Mutti- Vari Chart for a23 by Inr Shape - storage Method
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Response is sheet metal deflection from nominal on hood Pt a30

Multi-Vari Chart for a30 by Inr Shape - storage Method
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Figure 30: DOE results for Pt a30 around 2006 Explorer Hood
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2nd Level DOE Analysis:
• Chose 8 CTQ's - pts 3,5,9,11,21,23,27,30
• Analyzing the data shows • A - Int Shape (5)
• B - Flange Length (4)
• C - Storage Time (5)
• D - Storage Method (8)

Significant Interactions:
• AB (6)
• CD (5)
• Which Factors have highest cost implications?
• Validation Study: Run 5 panels with the same xl, x2, x3, and x4
Next Steps:
• Define critical few "x's"
• Find mathematical relationship: y=f(x)
• Identify operating window of critical x's to achieve desired "Y"
DOE results analyzed and optimized to define the mathematical model:
~ Y (ilnod

Deflection) = F(X) = function of (,\ = Inner Shape, B = Outer Flange, &

C

= Storage Time)

Mathematical Models:
Pt 3: ~y = -0.007 + O.OOSA + 0.004B + 0.009C + 0.007AB
Pt 9: ~y = 0.659 + 0.17C
Pt 23: ~y = 0.379 - O.lSB + 0.2SC
Pt 30: ~y = -0.037 + 0.004C
Most Important Factor = Storage Method: Horizontal- Recommended by DOE
Recommendations for hood quality improvements are:
•

Maintain current Hood Inner Shape

•

Maintain current Hood Outer Flange length

•

Store completed hoods horizontally for 24 hours for epoxy cure if not cured during e-coat
oven process.

However, in keeping with Lean Manufacturing principles, recommend hood conveyor from
Hood Hemming Line to Hood Installation station (70 ft distance) keeping hoods in the
horizontal position during the short conveyance. The completed bodies then go through
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Paint's e-coat system and ovens; which, fully cures the two-part epoxy in the hood hem.
Contrasted with the LAP management direction for hood storage as shown in the following
picture:

Figure 16 - Hood Storage Methodology in Contrast with DOE Recommendations
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Understanding the problem is vital to developing solutions that permanently reduce the error
state. This requires what the Japanese call: Genchi Genbutso - Go Look and See. Using
Structured Problem Solving in the form of a DOE, the best methodology for manufacturing
the Explorer hood was determined. Missing from this manufacturing scene is the
implementation of the DOE recommendations by management adding wastes and costs to
the Ford enterprise - the greatest being over production which leads to most of the other
types of wastes.

From a broad perspective, to accomplish Structured Problem Solving effectively, as stated in
the previous section on customer satisfaction, Ford Motor Company and the UAW need to
restructure the negotiated contract eliminating many lines of demarcation and job
classifications leaving only several to manage - Quality Leader, Team Member, and Material
Handling for instance. This action will effectively promote the ability to reduce or eliminate
Judgment Inspection in favor of Informative Inspection by allowing inspection to be part of
the process and operation. During an informative inspection, you check for abnormalities and
perform feedback and action; this allows you to eliminate the cause of the problem at the
source and reduce defects. In Figure 4, the two inspectors at the end of the line would be
unnecessary, and non-value added to the process since the detection of errors they catch don't
give an indication of the root cause. We might be able to infer to the root cause, but without
seeing defect occur an inference is all it is, which requires more investigation by dedicated
Black Belts or Green Belts.

"Instead of looking for defects that have already occurred, informative or source inspections
check for errors that may cause defects. Feedback is then carried out and immediate action
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taken to prevent the error from generating a defect.
Thus, there are two types of quality control:
1

Quality control to reduce defects by judgment inspection

2

Quality control to eliminate defects by informative inspection" [19]

Therefore, the reduction of job classifications would allow Ford Motor Company to insert
manual inspection methods into the process as part of standardized work elements reducing
the potential for defects.

D. Standardization:
Every problem is a deviation from a standard! Strict adherence to process standards promotes
structured problem solving and identification of variations and waste. Starting with the
operators and using MODAPTS to standardize every element of work to its basic form allows
each operation to be balanced based on Takt time with the ability to add informative
inspection into the process where needed. MODAPTS standardizes every motion including
steps or walks to discreet amounts of time. This method eliminates performance rated
stopwatch evaluations, and the mistrust formed between management and labor.

The Lean benefits of standardizing work elements allow the creation of "Standardized Work
Combination Tables", shown in Table 2, not only prescribes operator instructions in a
standardized format, it also allows the operators, supervisors, and engineers alike to see
unnecessary non-valued added wastes in the process. Knowing the unnecessary non-valued
added wastes provides a basis for continuous improvement in efficiency and quality of the
products.
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STANDARDIZED WORK COMBINATION TABLE
PROCESsl

C-Pillar Assembly

11 Inspect in-process part LH Pack LH set
12 Inspect in-process part LH Pack RH set
13

Name

TIME

Date

I
I

Kenneth Ryan

Qty/Sh,fi

1 Apil2006

TAKT

600

~:t~Ual

75 seconds (2 setsllWalk

____ _ _

MI,

,.,

10
10

Return

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
ITOTAL

68

36

5

Table 3 - Standardized Work Combination Table
Standardizing work elements can only happen with better training and strict adherence to
process writing standards by the engineering community. As discussed in the previous
chapter, inconsistently written process sheets lead to inaccurate MODAPTS, which in turn
affect standardizing work elements.

Standardizing work elements also gives engineering an understanding of labor impacts and
process methodologies of a new system helping to avoid troublesome spots far ahead of
implementation. To illustrate this point, a quick summary of Louisville Assembly Plant's hood
line showed over 1200 hoods waiting for value-added work (installation to a vehicle)
increasing inventory costs, material handling costs for extra conveyance of parts in racks, and
two extra operators to transfer hoods from assembly line to racks.

Standardization of work through virtual manufacturing techniques and structured problem
solving enhances manufacturing innovation into lean production systems. One of those
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systems being investigated to re-innovate Ford Motor Company to a lean manufacturing
system is laser welding.

L.A.P. LASER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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Figure 17 - Louisville Assembly Plant Laser System Schematic
This one laser cell will cut holes and weld the roof panel onto Explorers, Mountaineers, and
Sport Tracs replacing six different welding stations performing the tasks in 23 seconds
compared to conventional resistance welding's 2 minutes and 33 seconds. Both time and
space are saved along with the great waste of over production by reducing the numbers of
vehicles in the system from six to one.

This manufacturing technological innovation also allows greater flexibility in product
development advances in materials and weight as demonstrated in the next figure.

- 55 -

8

Construction Unit Width

Figure 18 - Laser Welding vs. Resistance Welding Reduction of Flange

Laser Welding vs. Spot Welding Comparison
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With metal sheet thickness more than 3.5 mm a diameter of the spot torch of20mm is required!

Figure 19 - Laser Welding vs. Spot Welding Comparison

- 56 -

Advantages of reduced flange widths follow a lean system in manufacturing and design by
producing sections that:
1

Higher prof1le section at same work piece width

2

Less weight

3

Higher stiffness in seams in comparison to conventional welding techniques

4

High process speed

By implementing these engineering innovations and standardizing these systems across Ford's
manufacturing arena, Ford can realize waste reductions in the design and manufacturing
systems allowing the assembly plants more flexibility to meet customer demand of the
products desired.

E. Level Scheduling:
To achieve process stability and system standardization it is recommended that Ford Motor
Company and its supplier base practice Level Scheduling. A level production schedule allows
suppliers and the company to achieve production process stability. The purpose is to meet
customer demand by adjusting a manufacturing facility's build schedule to stable volumes and

mix rates over a set period of time. This keeps inventories from varying dramatically day-today allowing better control over materials and reducing the burden of over-production.
A level schedule allows a supplier to develop, execute, and sustain a manufacturing process
based on Standardization and incorporated in the following processes:
1

Delivery schedule - reduce inventory to what is needed by the customer

2

Production schedule based on a consistent cycle time, process layout, & number of
workers - increase efficiencies thus reducing non-value added work, and fully utilizing
each worker
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3

Tooling & Equipment Preventative Maintenance schedule - allows scheduled time to
perform critical PM work on necessary tools and equipment.

4

Structured Problem Solving - level scheduling promotes standardization from which a
problem is a deviation from a standard and forces inspection back to the process to

understand and root cause the concern.
5

Scheduled continuous improvement - allows for Ford's 6Sigma kaizen events to occur
to make enhancements in the design or process.

6

Downstream supplier production/delivery schedule - it all starts with the customer
and a level schedule allows for deliveries meeting customer demand for the products
they want.

Earlier shown was a typical Ford build schedule in Table 1. Table 3 takes that same schedule
and levels it based on Body Type and Engine. You can go even further in detail by leveling on
items of greater complexity such as vehicle Grade and Color.
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Table 4 - Louisville Assembly Plant with Level Schedule
Compared to Table 1, Table 3 illustrates a more repetitive pattern for Body Type and Engine
level production schedule so that for a set period of time a supplier is required to produce and
deliver the same part number, in the same volume and mix (generally with a maximum
fluctuation of ±S%). Again, a level schedule allows the downstream supplier to standardize its
production/ delivery schedule, which in turn affects a positive outcome in quality and
ultimately customer satisfaction.
Shigeo Shingo best describes Toyota's level scheduling system, "While some argue that the
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most important benefit of the Toyota production system is that it prevents surplus capacity
disparities from influencing upstream processes, its real superiority lies in its ability to
minimize stocks of finished products." [20]

Louisville Assembly Plant needs improved understanding of Lean techniques to improve its
competitiveness as demonstrated by one simple system - the hood assembly and storage line.
As shown in Table 2, hood inners and outers should be scheduled in the same quantity
supplied on a daily basis to meet manufacturing demands based on customer orders; which
improves the quality of parts from special cause damages, thus improving customer
satisfaction.

With increased customer satisfaction, demand for the vehicle could stabilize or rise allowing
better marketing and sales forecasting. The ultimate goal is the ability to give the customers
the vehicles they want without having to create "dealer packages" in order to push product
onto the customer base, again "minimizing stocks of finished products" and thus creating a
leaner system in inventory, or over production. But the whole manufacturing and product
development systems behind it must be standardized and structured to provide for this
"customer driven Pull system", resolving problems in a structured format, increase quality and
customer satisfaction, ultimately increasing profits. After all, aren't we here for the money?
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Chapter IV: Literature Review - Leadership & Philosophy to Sustainable Profitability
A. Confronting the brutal truth:
3 April 2006: Toyota Motor Manufacturing stock ptlce closed at $110.35; Ford Motor

Company - $7.77! How do you explain Toyota's stock price valued at 14.2 times the value of
Ford's?
According to the Chicago Tribune l21], "The easy explanation is that U.S. carmakers start at a
clear disadvantage: They are plagued by "legacy costs," the sky-high pension and health-care
expenses brought on by union contracts and generations of retired employees." The article
points out, "But interviews with current and former Ford executives indicate that there are
other, less obvious legacy costs as well. Ford, they say, suffers from years of short-term
thinking and billions in questionable investments. While it tried to adopt the highly-efficient
management strategies pioneered by Toyota, those efforts have been hobbled by a lack of
firm, consistent leadership at the top and a divisive, feudalistic corporate culture that has
grown up over the years. The result is a high-cost, inflexible operation that leaves Ford trailing
even GM when it comes to efficiency. David Cole, chairman of the Center for Automotive
Research, a non-profit think tank based in Ann Arbor, Mich., estimates that excluding labor
expenses, Ford's operating costs are as much as $1,000 per vehicle higher than GM's - a major
competitive disadvantage. Former Ford executives say the gap between Ford and Toyota on
the cost of materials has trended as high as $1,600 a vehicle. "If GM had Ford's (operating)
costs it would be gone," Cole said."
"What's most striking - and telling - about this period of management turmoil is how different
it is from the way Toyota operates. Consistent leadership, teamwork and investment in the
future are the hallmarks of the Toyota system. "It requires leadership behavior that is long
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term and contemplative," said University of I\Iichigan professor Jeffrey Liker, author of the
"The Toyota Way." "It requires a way of working together and reaching a degree of consensus.
This is a set of things that don't come naturally to a traditional U.S. manufacturer like Ford.""

[2: 11
Mark Fields calls the problem "chimneys" as illustrated by another Ford executive's account in
the same Chicago Tribune article, "As executives sought to protect their empires, meetings of
the l\mericas group often devolved into blame fests, not problem-solving sessions, said one
former member of the group. Worse, a lack of fIrm leadership meant the company was often
run by committee where everyone had a vote. This led to slow decision-making and a
dysfunctional lack of accountability."[21[
The lack of accountability is a failure of management to recognize the overall importance of
the endgame - sustainable profItability. But how do you deal with these adverse fInancial
times when you don't know how the story will prevail?
In the Stockdale Paradox, Admiral James Stockdale, Congressional i'vIedal of Honor recipient
for shouldering the burden of command as a prisoner of war in Vietnam's Hannoi Hilton
from 1965-1973 keeping high the number i\merican prisoners that survived, said of that
adverse time, "I never lost faith in the end of the story," he said, when I asked him. "I never
doubted not only that 1 would get out, but also that I would prevail in the end and turn the
eKperience into the defIning event of my life, which, in retrospect, I would not trade."
When asked, "who didn't make it out?" "Oh, that's easy," Admiral Stockdale responded, "the
optimists!"
Continuing his lesson, Admiral Stockdale made one of the most crucial points that Ford
eKecutives need to fully understand and appreciate, "This is a very important lesson. You must
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never confuse faith that you will prevail in the end-\V-hich you can never afford to lose-with
the discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might
be." [22]

B. Leadership:
Has the Way Forward Plan confronted the brutal reality that Ford Motor Company needs to
change? Absolutely. Is the Way Forward Plan realistic about achieving sustainable success by
2008? Probably not is the answer. Where do you start? You start naturally at the top with
leadership.
Let's look at a different industry comparing Bethlehem Steel to Nucor Steel. Both companies
faced the competitive challenge of cheap imported steel. "Bethlehem Steel's CEO summed
up the company's problems in 1983 by blaming imports: "Our fIrst, second, and third
problems are imports." Ken Iverson and his crew at Nucor considered the same challenge
from imports a blessing, a stroke of good fortune ("Aren't we lucky; steel is heavy, and they
have to ship it all the way across the ocean, giving us a huge advantage!"). Iverson saw the
fIrst, second, and third problems facing the American steel industry not to be imports, but
management ... telling a stunned gathering of fellow steel executives in 1977 that the real
problems facing the American steel industry lay in the fact that management had failed to keep
pace with innovation." [231
Innovation is the key to Bill Ford's vision as he introduced the Way Forward Plan, "Bill Ford:
"Ford Motor Company was solidly profItable in 200S and growing around the world. The
next chapter in our history will be remembered for a renewed commitment to innovation and
as the time we moved boldly to prepare Ford's North American business for global
competition." [9]
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But as the prenous example of the steel industry exemplifies,

1t

takes leadership able

understand what needs to happen to build, create, and contribute to sustained success.

It

takes a "Level 5 Leader".
The lack of Level 5 Leaders as Jim Collins, author of "Good to Great" puts it, is probably the
most oppressive factor in Pord's current situation. According to Jim Collins, "Level 5 leaders
want to see the company even more successful in the next generation, comfortable with the
idea that most people won't even know that the roots of that success trace back to their
efforts. As one J ,evel 5 leader said, "I want to look out from my porch at one of the great
companies in the world someday and be able to say, 'I used to work there.' " [241
At Pord, the situation is more akin to the Chicago Tribune article, "But former executives say
the question isn't intent - it's execution. Because Ford has so many engineering fiefdoms and a
lack of strong leaders to force them to cooperate, agreeing on a shared design or dividing up
development responsibilities can turn into a dogfight. One former executive, for instance, said
bc~cause

of turf battles, the percentage of common parts on the Mazda6-Pusion platform is

only 30 percent, well behind the Japanese. This means Ford isn't getting the full benefit of
economies of scale in parts buying. Instead, it is forced to hammer on suppliers for lower
costs, creating financial problems for them." r21]
Creating financial problems for your supplier base has profound effects on the assembler's
end cost and quality of parts. In a lean system, the assembler and the supplier must establish
the most important part of a business relationship - Respect and trust. ;\s James Womack
states in "The l\1achine That Changed The World", "the assembler must respect the supplier's
need to make a reasonable profit ... well aware of the learning CU1ye that exists for producing
practically any item. So they realize that costs should fall in subsequent years, even though
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raw-materials costs and wages increase somewhat.

Improvements in lean-production

companies should, in fact, come much faster - that is, learning curves should be much steeper
- than in mass-production companies because of kaizen." [251
These improvements in cost and quality at the suppliers and the assembler, Ford :t\Iotor
Company,

alike

don't

happen

just because

you

implement Lean

techniques

and

methodologies. So what does make the difference between the comparison company Toyota,
and Ford? The difference is trust and the realization that improving actual operations are not
the job of management - it's the job of the workers themselves.
Toyota's philosophy in leadership is not merely the creation and use of lean toolsets, but in
making all its work a series of nested, ongoing experiments.

Their leadership views

standardization as the explicit specification of how work is accomplished coupled with testing
work as it is being done.

1\S

Steven Spear states in the Harvard Business Review, May 2004,

"The end result is that gaps between what is expected and what actually occurs become
immediately evident.

Not only are problems contained, prevented from propagating and

compromising someone else's work, but the gaps between expectations and reality are
investigated; a deeper understanding of the product, process, and people is gained; and that
understanding is incorporated into a new specification, which becomes a temporary "best
practice" until a new problem is discovered."

l26J

In Toyota's training system, creating LevelS leaders starts with Genchi Genbutso - Go Look
and See. There is no substitute for direct observation. Leaders are trained to lead by example,
and foster an atmosphere committed to resolving problems. Toyota accomplishes this by
training their leaders to directly ObSelye problem letting the failures tell him what he needed to
know. The leaders then learn how to propose changes that should always be structured as
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experiments - in structured problem solving events. They are encouraged to experiment as
frequently as possible, making small incremental changes rather than large system-design
changes. "\nd last and most important, their leaders coach, not fix! But without getting down
to the lowest point and understanding how to observe, propose structured experiments, and
make small changes they cannot lead at Toyota. l\nd without this leadership, the Toyota
Production System starts to fail.

C. The Doom Loop:
Leadership is definitely the key to recovery and building a process to sustain success. "\ny
Level 5 ] ,eader will recognize that when righting a ship, and new initiative must be \vell
thought out and planned accordingly to keep from entering Jim Collins' "Doom Loop".
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Figure 20 - The Doom Loop

One of the symptoms that you're in the Doom Loop is that you're so overwhelmed by crisis

you feel there's no time to learn your way out - that's not really true. Everyone acts as if
there is no time to do tasks that don't appear to contribute to results. Of course, this belief
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runs counter to what \ve all know from real life. Improved results come from better decisions
and more effective follow-up, learning, and practice, and not from obsessive focus on the
outcome. You simply do not get better without practice, and the practice re(luired of most of
u:; in the Doom JDOP is to engage in ruthlessly honest reflection on what's happening in our
business. Toyota was in the same situation around 1950, but had a plan called the Toyota
Production System (l'PS) that they would nurture and foster an environment between
management and labor to provide for continuous improvement and future sustainable success.
TPS was well thought out and executed that a whole new industry of experts and consultants
evolved to what is now known as 1"can Manufacturing.
But to get out of the Doom Loop,

~Iark

Fields is trying to point this company in the right

dltection by following one of Toyota's most basic ideas.
"He [Mark Fields] is also working on another Japanese idea. At Toyota, according to James
Womack, president of the Lean Enterprise Institute, '\vhat managers do is ask questions - they
don't give answers." rields hopes to instill the same management style at Ford.
"Our culture is that the senior guys on top have all the answers and those below must justify
the thoughts of the higher-ups," Fields said. "But those on top don't have all the answers. I
don't have all the answers."
\Vhether Fields is the man to bring order to the maelstrom at Ford remains an open question.
But Womack said his best strategy is to usc the crisis atmosphere for all it's worth. People
forget, he said, that Toyota nearly went bankrupt in 1950 and only afterwards developed its
world-beating system. Paraphrasing Taiichi Ohno, an early advocate of the Toyota Production
System, Womack said, "No one does this stuff unless they're desperate."

1211

After an intensive study of the Way hmvard plan, I find myself questioning what the "Plan"
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really is, and how it's going to meet Ford f\Iotor Company's financial goals and allow
sustainable success. Ford f\Iotor Company has all the tool sets in its inventory, but just needs
to get back to the history that Henry Ford created - uncompromising improvements in
manufacturing efficiency and quality. Henry demonstrated his leadership by looking for
himself, experimenting for himself, and teaching and expecting the same from the people
around him. These are the philosophies that Ford was built on, and Toyota vastly improved.

Therefore, I conclude that "The Way I·'orward" plan needs to adopt "The Process for
Sustained Success" to fully utilize its Lean Manufacturing toolsets and achie\'e Ford Motor
Company's long-term goals to be successful many years in the future.

- 68-

Chapter V: Conclusions
A. Summary:
This thesis introduced a unique high-le,rel perspective on the implementation of Lean
J\[anufacturing to Ford l\lotor Company. The Process to Sustained Success leads Ford on a
journey to adopt and use lean manufacturing in every aspect of its business from marketing
and sales to the manufacturing centers, accounting, material handling and scheduling, product
development, and Ford's supplier base.

The concept that continuous improvement through waste reduction in the automoti,'C
industry lay with the achievements of Henry Ford putting all the pieces together to create a
complete system of mass production starting with the moving conveyor belt and division of
labor. Toyota's creation out of necessity, the Toyota Production System, invented the new
concepts of lean production extending from product planning through all the steps of
manufacture and supply system coordination onto the customer. Toyota's almost fanatical
adherence to the Toyota Production System and waste reduction has led them to become the
most profitable automotive maker in the world.

The Process to Sustained Success really did nothing more than assimilate lean manufacturing
techniques into a simple management process tool to help dri,re waste reduction and increase
profitability. But it asks certain hard things of the leadership at Ford Motor Company:
1

Change the way you think about your role at Ford from a manager to a teacher and
coach by learning the simple techniques of observation and experimentation to
reduce waste. Teaching and fostering an environment that promotes waste reduction
has the positive effect of improving the company's profitability through the

elimination of direct and indirect costs. The simple attitude of looking for and
obselTing the best way to reduce \vastes and defects will have an enormous benefit in
customer satisfaction by eliminating problems before they occur.
2

Align your organization not around the fiefdoms you've built, but around what's best
for the enterprise of Ford l\lotor Company. Standardizing organizations around
design, processes and disciplines, then simplifying and communizing components
that customers don't regard as high impact to 'Thicle desire, i.e. window switches,
creates the basis for standardization in the manufacturing arenas. Through
standardization of designs, manufacturing wastes can be observed and eliminated. In
addition to standardizing designs and processes, practicing] ,evel Scheduling starts the
process of flexible manufacturing allowing Materials, Planning, & Logistics 0\fP&L)
to optimize packaging of parts, and routes of delivery to every assembly plant. When
organizations align themselves with the common goal of reducing wastes, the
company profits.

3

Management and labor need to implicitly tmst each other and give the opportunity to
succeed to the operators on the floor coached by management on waste reduction
techniques.

This last point allows true empowerment of the operator to imprcwe quality of the vehicle,
and of their working conditions.

~\

good thing about tmst is that is grows, and once this

system is put in place it gives people the chance to become as good as they can. It also
encourages then to find better ways to get their work done while improving quality and costs
to Ford Motor Company. Basically, people don't want to fail, so why not give them the
opportunity to succeed?
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The main key points to gain from The Process to Sustain Success are to provide a leyel
schedule for production and suppliers, standardized work clements, continuous imprm'ement
through observation and experimentation (struchlred problem solving), which \vill improve
customer satisfaction, and hence increase profits.

Cnfortunately, the Way Forward Plan with its circular loop (please refer to Figure 1) doesn't
point to an objective, which, in this case is Profitability. The Way Forward rests on the
principles of Bold Leadership, Competitive Cost and Capacity, Clear Pricing, Great Quality,
Bold Innm'ative Products, Customer Pocus and Strong Brands. These principles are all
necessary points, but not targeting the core objective - profitability.

B. Areas of Future Study:
The Process to Sustained Success focused on the high-level application of setting up or
revising a complete enterprise such as Ford Motor Company into a lean production system.
Future research into the specific lean manufacturing tools for each process step should be
pursued to give better operational direction and standardization.

l\fanagement and labor relations playa major role on the impact to a manufacturing facility
and the de\'elopment of a lean enterprise. J ,abor i, critical to the success of implementing
lean principles. How labor accepts accountability for efficiency and quality improvements in
a union shop is determined on the le\'el of trust. This trust must be given and fostered in a
learning environment.
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Supplier relations concerning their quality and cost improvements would be a great area for
further study. Again, there must be a trust benveen assembler and supplier to understand
each other's businesses making sure that one or the other isn't going to get into financial or
quality difficulties. One cannot survive without the other. Reducing wastes and controlling
costs are

\~ital

for both to survive, and the assembler can't forget that point.

Lastly, the study and improvement of the interaction benveen Marketing and Sales and the
dealership nenvorks to provide a better understanding of customer needs and wants versus
manufacturing capabilities to further imprO\'e a "Pull" system and challenge the production
system in flexibility and level schedule. Again, it all starts with the customer, and by trying to
meet customer demand without producing excessive inventories for dealers allows both the
dealership and automotive company to thrive.
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Glossary of Lean Manufacturing Terms
Following is a short list of terms often used in explaining lean manufacturing techniques.

Cellular Manufacturing - linking of manual and machine operations into the most
efficient combination to maximize value-added activities while minimizing wastc. "\ cell
layout is typically C -shaped and utilizes one-picce flow.

Kanban System - a pull system that uses color-coded cards attached

to

parts or part

containers to regulate the upstream production and delivery flow.

Lean Manufacturing - the process of analyzing the flow of information and materials in
a manufacturing enyironment and continuously improving the process to achie,-e
enhanced value to the customer.

Non-Value Added - Any activity that does not add market form or function or is not
necessary. (l'hese activities should be eliminated, simplified, reduced or integrated.)

Pull System - method of controlling the flow of resources by replacing only \vhat has
been consumed. A pull system relies on customer demand.

Push System - resources are provided to the consumer based on forecasts or schedules.
(Lean manufacturing encourages the elimination of push systems.)

Takt Time - customer demand rate. Takt time sets the pace of production to match the
rate of customer demand and becomes the heartbeat of any lean system. It is calculated
by taking the work time available and dividing it by the number of units sold.

Value Added - Any activity that increases the market form or function of the product or
service. (l'hese are things the customer is willing to pay for.)

Value Engineering - Improves the product by designing or redesigning to maintain
quality while reducing manufacturing costs.

Judgment Inspection - Inspection based on a "post-mortem" of quality defects
discovered at final inspection distinguishing defective from non-defective products.

Informative Inspection - Informs processing whenever a defect is discovered at the
point of origin so that steps can be taken to correct the processing method or condition
and preyent recurrence.

ILVS (In Line Vehicle Sequencing) - Sequential Part Delivery or SPD is the process
of delivering automotive parts to an assembly plant in the exact order or sequence in
which the vehicles that need them are coming down the production line.

MODAPTS - l\IODulat "\ttangetnent of Predetermined Time Standards is a
predetermined time system used for:
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• Calculating reliable production standards,
• Improving an organization's productivity,
• Analyzing departmental efficiency, and
• Improving employee relations.

KAIZEN - Continuous incremental improvement in the production process.
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Appendix A

Ford Motor Company Historical Timeline:
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Appendix B

Announcement of the The Way Forward Plan:

DEARBORN, Mich., Jan. 23, 2006 - Ford Motor Company [NYSE: F] today announced
details of a comprehensive plan to restore profitability to its automotive business in North
Ametlca no later than 2008. h)rd will apply lessons learned from consumers and the
company's successes around the world to strengthen its Ford, Lincoln and :Mercury brands
and deliver more innovative products while simultaneously reducing costs and improving
quality and productivity.
"The automoti\Te market in North .\merica is rapidly becoming as crowded and fragmented
as other global markets," said Bill Ford, chairman and CEO. "To meet this challenge, we are
acting with speed to strengthen the Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brands, deliver the innovation
customers demand and create a business stmcture for us to compete - and win - in this era
of global competition.

"'We will be making painful sacrifices to protect Ford"s heritage and secure our future," he
added. "Going forward, we will be able to deliver more innovative products, better returns
for our shareholders and stability in the communities where we operate."

Ford Around the World - 2006 Outlook
For 2006, the company is expecting another year of profitability from automotive operations
outside of North America. PreTtax profits, excluding special items, are expected from
automotive operations in South America, Europe (Ford of Europe and Premier

~\utomotive

Group), AsiaTPacific and i\frica, and from I\lazda and Associated Operations.

North

Ametlcan automotive operations arc expected to be unprofitable. O\Terall, Ford's global
automotive operations are expected to have preTtax losses in 2006, while Ford :Motor Credit
is expected to achieye preTtax profits.

The underlying assumptions behind this outlook include: fullTyear industry \Tolumes of 17
million units in the U.S. and 17.3 million units in Europe; industry net pricing that is expected
to be down slightly in the U.S. and Europe. Also, the company's quality performance is

T
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expected to improve, market share is expected to stabilize or improve in all regions, and cost
performance is expected to be favorable. Capital expenditures of approximately $7 billion
arc expected during 20()6, while the company expects its year-end cash balance to be more
than $20 billion.

Beyond the above expectatlOns, the company is providing no other guidance about its
financial performance for 2006 - to keep employees and investors focused on one goal:
sustainable profitability over time in all regions.

"'We must be guided by our long-term goals of building our brands, satisfying customers,
developing strong products, accelerating innovation, and, most importantly, producing a
sustainable profit from our automotive business," said Bill hlrd.

Ford in North America - the Way Forward
Ford's automotive business in North America was profitable in 2003 and 2004, thanks to the
product investments and cost reductions dri,-en by the company's Revitalization Plan,
announced in 2002.
Since that time, more and stronger competition

111

all segments, a faster-than-expected

customer shift from traditional SCV s into other segments, significantly higher material and
energy costs and other factors have resulted in lower market share and higher costs for the
company.

"The team in North "\merica, led by Mark Fields and supported by ,\nne Stevens, deYeloped
the plan for North ,\merica, drawing on their extensive global experience in ,\sia, Europe
and The i\mericas. 'l'hey have reenergized the Ford team to make it work, and they have the
full support of the hlrd Motor Company behind them," said Jim Padilla, president and chief
operating officer.

Flc1ds, executive \'ICe president and president, The ,\mericas, calls the plan the "Way
Forward." It touches every piece of the North "\merican business to make it more customerfocused, product -dri,-cn and efficient, including:
1

~lore

clarity for the I ;'ord, l,incoln and

~Iercury
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brands -- with a sharper focus on the

customer and a clear point of view that will appeal to more buyers than today.
2

A renewed commitment to design, safety and technology innovation to differentiate
Ford Motor Company and its products in the marketplace.

3

New product investments - utilizing Ford's global architectures and scale - to deliver
more new products faster, including more crossovers, hybrid vehicles, new small cars,
increased spending on Pord's truck leadership and new "white space" products.

4

l\1aterial cost reductions of at least $6 billion by 2010.

5

Continued straightforward pricing that is clear, credible and simple, which will further
improve residual values.

6

i\ lean and flexible manufacturing system combined with capaclty matched to
demand.

Capacity will be reduced by 1.2 million units or 26 percent by 200S,

representing the majority of actions within the plan's 2006-2012 period.
7

Plant-related employment is reduced by 25,000-30,000 people in the 2006-2012 time
period, in addition to salaried personnel reductions and a reduction in the company's
officer ranks.

Stronger Ford, Lincoln and Mercury Brands
Ford kicked off the Way Forward plan in October with a comprehensive analysis of
consumer attitudes and values in the U.S. automotive market. The goal was to develop a
laser-like focus on different customer targets for hm.I, Lincoln and f"rercury to guide each
brand's design, engineering and marketing decisions.

"One of the most important findings from this research is that Americans really do want to
buy "\merican brands, as long as they are competitive with the imports," said helds. "We
know this, because it's already working in some segments today, such as the success of the
new Ford Fusion in the import-dominated midsize car market.

"Of all the leading automakers, we believe Ford is ,\merica's Car Company because of \vhere
we've been. In terms of economic and social influence, there is no other company that's had
a greater impact on the lives of people in the U.S. and in the 20th century than Ford."
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Customers identify with Ford and its uniquely American story, the research also revealed.

"The challenge going forward is to give our customers" employees, retirees, dealers, suppliers
and investors a reason to believe in Ford. That is going to be our focus," Fields said. "Our
\Vay Forward is not a retreat into smaller markets, but a retaking of the \merican
1

marketplace. It's time to play offense. It's time to fight back.

"\Xle will compete vigorously to be .\merica's Car Company, winning the hearts and tninds of
even more customers," he added. "We will maintain our commitment to our loyal truck
customers, while delivering innovative and boldly styled cars, crossovers, SLTV s and other allnew products that will appeal to people who are still inspired by the ;\merican dream."

With that clear point of view in the marketplace, Ford is investing in new products for rord,
Lincoln and Mercury.

The investment includes moving forward with the company's plan to offer hybrid technology
on half of the company's Ford, Mercury and Lincoln nameplates in the U.S.
Today, the company is announcing that hybrid versions of the Ford Five Hundred, Mercury
Montego, Ford Edge and Lincoln 1\IKX will debut in the 2008-2010 timeframe. The new
hybrids will join the Ford Escape and Mercury Mariner hybrids, which are on sale today, as
well as the rord Fusion and Mercury 1\I11an hybrids, which will debut in 2008. Overall, Ford
Motor Company plans to build 250,000 hybrids a year by 2010.

Ford also is announcing that it will introduce new "white space" products to reach customers
in new segments, and accelerate plans to bring even more crossover vehicles and new small
cars to market. l\t the same time, the company announced that it is increasing its product
investment in Ford F-Series truck leadership; increasing momentum on its blockbuster cars
today, such as the Ford Fusion and Ford l\Iustang; introducing more design innovations
more "at a glance" sheet metal changes

~

~

for

and introducing more safety innovations

throughout its North" \merican lineup.

"'With more focused brands, new product investment and innovation, Ford will slow the rate
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of loss and then stabilize our IT.S. market share in the ncar term, eyen as competitors add
new models," riclds said. "From there, we can set our sights on the future."

The Ford Brand: Tn the past, the Ford brand has demonstrated a clear customer focus in
many - but not all- sq.,>tIlents. Going forward, the Ford brand will build upon the success of
hits, such as the Ford F-Series, Explorer, Expedition, l\Iustang, Escape and Fusion, and enter
new segments with a clear, consistent and distinct point of view - one drin:n by bold,
i\merican design and innovation. The 2007 h>rd Edge, which goes on sale later this year,
embodies that spirit.

"'We know how to play offense and play to win," Fields said. "Our plan \vill deliver more
products - from small cars to our largest trucks - that are unmistakably Fords."

Ford remams committed to ma1t1tammg leadership in full-size pickup trucks with the FSeries. The company also plans to continue its momentum in midsize cars - with all-whecldrive and hybrid derivatives coming for the hml hlsion - and developing new small cars
and even more crossovers for the Ford brand.

l\lercury: Ford is recomnuttl11g itself to Mercury and has developed more focused
positioning that is a refinement of the work already done to revitalize the brand.

The newest Mercury products - the Milan, the Mariner and the Mariner Hybrid - are
artracting younger customers to the brand and more women than Ford-brand products in the
same segments, Fields said. In addition, they are bringing new customers to Ford Motor
Company - at conquest rates as high as 50 percent.

". rhe attraction of Mercury is modern, expressive design - one that is differentiated from
Ford vehicles. Our l\lercury target customer is not looking for product functionality that is
substantially different from Ford \'ehicles. But they do have different attitudes and values,
and they want a product that visually communicates that distinctiveness.

"Going forward, we will be more aggressive m appealing to these customers with clear,
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modern differentiation in the design of l\Iercurys, a uruque purchase expenence and
marketing that is targeted, personalized and interactive," Fields said.

Lincoln: Ford's vision for the Lincoln brand is to make Lincoln the reward for consumers
who are living the American dream. The company sees Lincoln becoming the largest volume
contributor to the Lincoln Mercury business.

"Lincoln customers don't need to shout about success. They are self-made people with
enough confidence to be elegant and understated," Fields said. "That understanding of the
Lincoln customers will drive our brand and product decisions going forward."

The 2006 Lincoln Zephyr, the brand's first entry-luxury car, and the 2007 Lincoln J\UC,,'{, the
brand's first crossover, are significant first steps. Going forward, the company plans to give
Lincoln vehicles an even clearer point of view through their powertrains, unique comfort and
convenience features and unique designs.

"Lincoln is about American luxury. There are many customers in this country living the
American dream and who would prefer to drive ,\merica's luxury car. That is where we are
headed," he added.

Straightforward Pricing: Ford is accelerating the clear-and-simple pncmg strategy that
began with the introduction of the Ford Fusion and Ford Mustang. Ford plans to reduce the
MSRP of its products and dramatically reduce and cap rebates as it introduces new products.

"We started introducing clear pricing two years ago. The success of Mustang and Fusion
proves that it works," Fields said. "We \vill bring sticker prices more in line with actual
transaction prices and cap 'cash on the hood' rebates as we introduce new cars and trucks
into the marketplace. It will protect our margins and consumers, too, through higher resale
values."

Ford also will increase its product advertising, focusmg on brand characteristics based on
innovative designs, features and customer benefits.
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Investment-Efficient Product Creation
Ford has committed to return its North "\merican automotive business to profitability no
later than 2008. Over time, the Way hmvard plan should deli,-er profitability throughout the
lineup - including new small cars - by achieving significant material cost savings as well as
quality and productivity improvements.

Several new initiatives will bolster ongoing work that already is yielding sit,mificant operating
improvements. Specifically:
1

Ford will use more global ,-ehicle architectures in North "\merica, particularly for cars
and crossovers, to reduce investment spending and improve quality.

2

The company will share more parts and systems that are invisible to the customer,
such as brakes, suspension and underbody components, across its North American,
European and Asian brands to leverage its global purchasing power for lower costs
and better quality.

3

Ford will continue to implement its Global Product Development System - which is
based, in part, on l\fazda's highly successful and efficient model - to reduce product
development times by six to 12 months, depending on the size of the program.

4

Ford will continue to invest in lean and flexible manufacturing, with 75 percent of its
North American assembly capacity being "flexible" by the end of 2008.

Improved quality will be achieved, in part, through the "Aligned Business Framework"
agreements with select strategic suppliers. The agreements are designed to strengthen
collaboration and create a more sustainable business model for both Ford and its key
suppliers to improve mutual profitability.

The i\ligned Business Framework - coupled with Ford's "Commodity Business Plan"
process and a new single-team approach to product de,-elopment and purchasing - \vill
deliver improved quality and drive technology inno\":1tions to Ford, while lowering costs.

"We are committed to developing strong relationships with a select group of more capable,
more financially stable strategic suppliers on a long-term basis," said Anne Stevens, executive
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vlce president and chief operating officer, The Americas. "Strong suppliers and proycn
processes that everyone sticks to religiously go hand in hand with delivering innovation,
quality and lower costs."

Smaller, Nimbler Organization
Achieving a lean fixed-cost structure and significantly improving Ford's North American
assembly capacity utilization are critical components of the Way Forward plan.

"'We're now well past the point in which one or hvo hit products can correct the overcapacity
we have or justify the stafflng levels we maintain - even with the significant actions we've
taken during the past couple of years," Stevens said. "Sadly, this isn't just a Ford issue. It's
an issue for our domestic competitors, as well.

"As hard and painful as it is to idle plants and reduce our work force, we know these
sacrifices are critical to set the stage for a stronger future," she added.

Ford is taking the following new actions to align its capacity with expected demand and to
reduce fixed costs:
1

14 manufacturing facilities will be idled and cease production by 2012, including a
total of seven vehicle assembly plants.

2

Assembly capacity will be reduced by 1.2 million units or 26 percent by the end of
2008.

3

A new low-cost manufacturing site is planned f,:)r the future.

Ford will idle the following facilities through 2008:
St. I,ouis Assembly
2

Atlanta Assembly

3

Wixom l\ssembly

4

Batavia Transmission

5

Windsor Casting (announced following CAW contract negotiations in 2(05)

6

Two additional assembly plants, which will be determined later this year

In addition, production at St. Thomas ,\ssembly will be reduced to one shift. Facilities
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operated by Automotive Components Holding LLC are not included

111

the new

announcement.

~All

of these actions will reduce total North ,\merican employment by 25,0()O-30,O()() people

in the 2006-2012 time period. This is in addition to the previously announced reduction of
the equivalent of 4,000 salaried positions in the first quarter of 2006 - or 10 percent of salaryrelated costs - and a reduction in the company's officer ranks by 12 percent by the end of the
first quarter.

Ford has briefed the leadership of the L' i\ W and CAW about these plans.

Financial Impact
2006 will be a vear of transition as Ford moves from its old North l\merican business model
to a new customer-focused strategy that is designed to restore automotive operations in the
region to profitability no later than 2008. The estimated pre-tax financial impact of the
North American plan in 2006 includes:
$250 million for hourly personnel separations - excluding L\CH actions.
$220 million for fixed asset write-offs.

"Our cost structure will improve as we progress through 2006 and increasingly thereafter,
and we'll return to profitability in our North L\merican automotive business no later than
2008," said Don Leclair, executive \-ice president and chief financial officer.

"We're

confident in our plan and optimistic \ve can achie\-e our goals."

Summary
rord begins a new era in its North American automotive business with a realistic view of the
challenges facing the company but also building on several important competitive strengths,
including:

1

A corporate commitment to design, safety and technology innovation.

2

Leadership in full-size pickup trucks, where the Ford F-Series has been No.1 for 29
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years.
3

,\ resurgent car business, paced by the Ford l\Iustang and Fusion, the Mercury l\Iilan
and the Lincoln Zephyr.

4

A strong and growing presence in crossover utility vehicles, todav's fastest-growing
segment.

S

Ford Credit, which continues to be closely linked to Ford's automotl\oe business,
delivering solid profitability.

6

More than 4,300 Ford and Jjncoln Mercury dealerships.

"Ford's strengths were built over 100 years, and we are taking the tough but necessary steps
to address our issues with candor, speed and compassion for the people affected by our work
force reductions," said Bill Ford. "This next chapter in Ford's history will be remembered
for our renewed commitment to innovation and as the time we moved boldly to prepare
Ford's North i\merican business to face global competition."
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Appendix C

l~he

Global 8 D System:

Background
In February, 1995, a cross-organizational steering committee was formed to develop a best
practice problem solving process and computerized system that merged differences between
organizational approaches to solving problems (TOPS, EQUIP TOPS, Prevent Recurrence
and others). The corporate-wide process and supporting system was to be made available to
Ford employees and suppliers and provide a common source of lessons learned. The original
Global 8D software system that came of this effort was a Windows-based client/server
program. In late 1998, a companion web application was created to be run over the Ford
intranet. With the continued focus on web technologies, the client/server system was
decomissioned at the end of 2000 and the Global 8D on the Web application is now the
single-source for working with 80s within I'ord.

Our Vision
The vision of Global 80 is to implement a common, enhanced, worldwide 80 problemsolving process for Ford Motor Company and its suppliers.

Our Mission
The mission of Global 8D is to provide a common process; which effectively defines and
resolves concerns and prevents their recurrence. Also:
1

Increase management understanding

2

Improve concern resolution and prevention

3

Improve performance to Quality/Cost/Timing

4

Promote frank and open problem solving

5

Provide automated computer support

DO - Prepare for the Ford Global 80 Process
Purpose:
In response to a symptom, evaluate the need for the G8D process. If necessary, provide an
Emergency Response Action to protect the customer and initiate the G80 process.

G8D Application Criteria:
1 The symptom(s) has been defined and quantified.
2

The G8D customer(s) who experienced the symptom(s), and the affected parties,
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when appropriate, have been identified.
3

Measurements taken to quantify the symptom(s) demonstrate that a performance gap
exists [\ND lOR priority (severity, urgency, growth) of the symptom warrants
initiation of the process.

4

The cause is unknown.

5

t"vIanagement is committed to dedicate necessary resources to fix the problem at the
root cause level and to prevent recurrence.

6

Symptom complexity exceeds the ability of one person to resolve

D1 - Establish Team
Purpose:
Establish a small group of people with the process and/ or product knowledge, allocated
time, authority, and skill in the required technical disciplines to solve the problem and
implement corrective actions. The group must have a designated Champion and Team
Leader. The group begins the team building process.

02 - Describe the Problem
Purpose:
Describe the internal/ external customer Problem by identifying "what is wrong with what"
and detail the Problem in quantifiable terms.

03 - Develop Interim Containment Action (ICA)
Purpose:
Defme, verify, and implement the Interim Containment Action (TeA) to isolate effects of the
problem from any internal/ external customer until Permanent Corrective l\ctions (PC\s) are
implemented. Validate the effectiveness of the containment actions.

04 - Define and Verify Root Cause and Escape Point
Purpose:
Isolate and verify the Root Cause by testing each possible cause against the problem
description and test data. Also isolate and verify the place in the process where the effect of
the Root Cause should have been detected and contained (Escape Point).
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05 - Choose and Verify Permanent Corrective Actions (PCAs) for
Root Cause and Escape Point

Purpose:
Select the best Permanent Corrective Action to remove the Root Cause. ,\lso select the best
Permanent Corrective Action to eliminate Escape. Verifr that both decisions will be
successful when implemented without causing undesirable effects.

D6 - Implement and Validate Permanent Corrective Actions (PCAs)
Purpose:
Plan and implement selected Permanent Corrective ,\ctions. Remove the Interim
Containment Action. Monitor the long-term results.

D7 - Prevent Recurrence
Purpose:
l'v[odify the necessary systems including policies, practices, and procedures to Prevent
Recurrence of this problem and similar ones. Make Recommendations for systemic
improvements, as necessary.

D8 - Recognize Team and Individual Contributions
Purpose:
Complete the team experience, sincerely recognize both Team and Individual Contributions,
and celebrate.
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Appendix D
Ford Motor Company 2005 Full Year Financials
Today Ford Motor Company is announcing its third consecutive year of profitability. Fullyear 2005 net income was $2 billion, or $1.04 per share, and fourth-quarter net income was
$124 million, or 8 cents per share.
Full-year pre-tax profits, from continuing operations, excluding special items, totaled $3.4
billion. On the same basis, the Automoti\'e sector lost $1 billion. Within this, South
America, Europe and Asia Pacific were profitable. These profits were more than offset by
losses in North America. Premier L\utomotive Group lost $100 million, sharply improved
from 2004. Financial Services reported a pre-tax profit of $4.4 billion.
A press release containing more details about our fourth-quarter and full-year results
attached.

1S

###

FORD MOTOR COMPANY REPORTS 2005 NET INCOME OF
$2 BILLION, PROFITABLE FOR THIRD CONSECUTIVE YEAR

o

Third consecutive year of profitability. Full-year net income of $2 billion, or $1.04 per share.

o

Full-year earnings from continuing operations of $1.28 per share or $2.5 billion after tax,
excluding special items.

o

Excluding special items, South L\merica, Europe and ~\sia Pacific were all profitable, but these
profits were more than offset by losses in North :\merica. Premier l\utomotive Group
continued to incur losses, but these were substantially reduced from 2004 levels.

o

hnancial Services, including Ford Motor Credit, reported strong results.
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DE1\RBORN, I\fich., Jan. 23,2006 - Ford t-vlotor Company lNYSE: FI today reported 2005
full-year net income of $2 billion, or $1.04 per share. In 2004, the company reported net
income of $3.5 billion, or $1.73 per share.

Excluding speClal items, l'ord's 2005 full-year after-tax income from continuing operations
totaled $2.5 billion, or $1.28 per share. This compares with year-ago earnings from
continuing operations of $4.3 billion, or $2.11 per share, excluding special items.

Full-year sales and revenue for 2005 was $178.1 billion, up from $171.7 billion a year ago.

"We accomplished many things in 2005, including the successful launch of the new Ford
Fusion, Mercury J\filan and Lincoln Zephyr, introduction of the company's new innovation
initiative, completion of the sale of Hertz, and an agreement with the LT AW to help reduce
rising health care costs," said Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Bill Ford. "Excluding
North America, our automotive operations made great progress in 2005; we must keep
\\ orking to improve our business in each and every region."

Special items reduced earnings by 6 cents per share in the fourth quarter. The pre-tax effect
of these items includes: a charge of $1.3 billion for impairment of Jaguar and Land Rover
fixed assets; personnel reduction actions of $962 million; and the sale of The Hertz
Corporation for a total profit of $1.5 billion, $1.4 billion of which was recorded in the fourth
quarter. In addition, the company's repatriation of foreign earnings pursuant to the
j\merican .lobs Creation

~\ct

of 2004 resulted in a permanent tax savings of about $250

million. Largely as a result of these factors and costs associated with Visteon-related
restructuring, special items reduced full-year income by 15 cents per share. hnally, full-year
net income from continuing operations was reduced by 9 cents primarily for a cumulative
change in accounting principles related to recent accounting guidance on the recognition of
environmental obligations.
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FULL-YEAR HIGHLIGHTS
Ford Motor Company full-year highlights include:

o

Launch of corporate innm'ation initiative, including a commitment to a ten-fold
increase in hybrid production by 2010.

o

Introduction of initiative to improve collaboration with select global suppliers of
key components and consolidate our supply base.

o

Sale of The Hertz Corporation, with proceeds of $5.6 billion.

o

hnalization of Visteon agreement, which included the creation of a Ford-managed,
temporary business entity named ,\utomotive Components Holdings, LLC. This
entity took ownership from Visteon of 17 plants and six offices, research centers and
other facilities. This arrangement protects the supply of components to Ford plants,
improves the competitiveness of Ford's supply base, and will reduce Ford's costs over
time.

o

Cessation of assembly operations at Jaguar's Browns Lane facility and consolidation
of its assembly operations at Castle Bromwich and closure of I"ord's Lorain Assembly
plant in J,orain, Ohio.

o

Reduction of total automotive personnel by more than 10,000 during 2005, through
personnel reduction actions and attrition.

o

Ratification of an agreement \vith the United ,\uto Workers (subject to court
approval) to reduce the company's health care costs primarily through modifications to
the hourly retiree health care plan. These actions are expected to reduce Ford's overall
retiree health care and life insurance (OPEB) obligation by $5 billion, with a projected
annual cost savings of about $650 million on a pre-tax basis.
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D

Establishment of a company contribution limit set at 2006 levels for health care
benefits and a reduction of life insurance benefits for l'.S. salaried retirees. These
actions reduced ford's overall retiree health care and life insurance (OPE B) obligation
by about $3 billion, with a projected annual cost savings of about $400 million on a
pre-tax basis.

FOURTH QUARTER
In the fourth quarter, the company reported net income of $124 million, or 8 cents per share.
This compares with fourth quarter net income of$104 million, or 6 cents per share, in 2004.
Excluding special items, fourth quarter after-tax income from continuing operations totaled
$511 million, or 26 cents per share, compared to $554 million, or 28 cents per share, a year
ago.

Total sales and revenue in the fourth quarter were $47.6 billion, compared to $44.9 billion in
the year-ago period.

Thefollo}j}in.~ dZ:l'atJJion o/the re.m/tJ %ur 'lutol1lotit'e Jedor and .'1utol1lotiz!e btlJineJJ unih iJ on a
fire-tax baJiJ that exdudeJ Jpeiia! item.'. See
[
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"Safe f {arbor/ Ri.l'k 1-'adorJ"jor the nature and Ilmount

o/!lieJc Jpeiial itemJ and a remndlia!ion to GA'1P.

AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR
For the full year, Ford's worldwide Automotive sector reported a pre-tax loss of $1 billion,
compared with pre-tax profit of $850 million a year ago. The decline primarily reflected
unfavorable cost performance, volume and mix, and exchange, partially offset by net pricing.

For the fourth quarter, r"ord's worldwide

~Automotive

sector reported a pre-tax loss of $12

million, an improvement of $458 million from a pre-tax loss of $470 million a year earlier.
The improvement primarily reflected favorable volume and mix, net pricing, cost
performance and exchange.
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\X'orldwide automotive revenue for 2005 was $154.5 billion, an improvement from revenue
of$147.1 billion a year ago. Total fourth-quarter automotive revenue was $41.8 billion, an
increase of $3 billion from a year ago.

Total company vehicle unit sales in 2005 were 6,818,000, an increase of 20,000 units from
2004. Fourth-quarter vehicle unit sales totaled 1,853,000, an increase of 102,000 units from a
year ago.

Automotive cash at Dec. 31, 2005, totaled $25.1 billion of cash, marketable securities, loaned
securities and short-term Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA) assets.

THE AMERICAS
The Americas reported a 2005 full-year pre-tax loss of $1.2 billion, compared to a pre-tax
profit of $1.6 billion a year ago. For the fourth quarter, the Americas had a pre-tax loss of
$15 million, an improvement of $411 million compared to a pre-tax loss of $426 million a
year earlier.

North America: For 2005, Ford's North America automotive operations reported a pre-tax
loss of $1.6 billion, a decline of $3 billion from 2004. The decline primarily reflected
unfavorable cost performance, lower V.S. market share, lower dealer inventories and adverse
exchange. For the year, North America's sales totaled $81.4 billion, compared with $83
billion a year earlier.

For the fourth quarter, North America automotive operations reported a pre-tax loss of$143
million, compared to a pre-tax loss of $470 million in 2004. The imprmTement primarily
reflected cost reductions and favorable net pricing, partially offset by operating losses
incurred by the former Visteon activities now controlled by Ford. Fourth-quarter sales were
$22.1 billion, compared with $21.1 billion in 2004.
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South America: Ford's South America automotive operations reported a pre-tax profit of
$3R9 million, an increase of $249 million from a 2004 pre-tax profit of $140 million. The
improvement primarily reflected net pricing and favorable volume, as well as a stronger
Brazilian currency. Full-year sales improved to $4.4 billion from $3 billion in 2004.

In the fourth quarter, Ford's South America automotive operations posted a pre-tax profit of

$[28 million, an improvement of $84 million, compared with a pre-tax profit of $44 million
in 2004. The improvement primarily reflected favorable net pricing and exchange. Fuurrhquarter sales were $1.3 billion, an impron:ment from $899 million a year ago.

FORD EUROPE AND PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE GROUP (PAG)
The combined 2005 full-year pre-tax profit for Ford Europe and P,\G was $36 million. This
compares with a loss of $626 million for 20()4. For the fourth quarter, Ford J<:urope and
PAG had a combined pre-tax profit of$112 million, an improvement from a pre-tax loss of
$324 million a year ago.

Ford Europe: Ford Europe posted a full-year pre-tax profit of$136 million, compared with
a pre-tax profit of $114 million a year ago. The improvement primarily reflected favorable
cost performance and exchange, partially offset by unfavorable net pricing and mix. Sales for
the year totaled $30.2 billion, compared to $26.5 billion in 2004.

For the fourth quarter, Ford Europe reported a pre-tax profit of $66 million, an
improvement from a pre-tax loss of $69 million a year ago. The improvement primarily
reflected favorable cost performance and higher profits at our operations in Turkey, partially
offset by unfavorable product mix. Fourth-quarter sales totaled $8.2 billion, compared to
$7.4 billion a year ago.

Premier Automotive Group: I;or 2005, PAG reported a full-year pre-tax loss of$l()O
million, an improvement from a pre-tax loss of $740 million a year ago. The improvement
primarily reflected the impact of new products, primarily at J ~and Rover, that resulted in a
richer mix and improved net pricing. Full-year sales for the group totaled $30.3 billion,
compared to $27.6 billion in 2004.
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In the fourth quarter, PAG reported a pre-tax profit of $46 million, an improvement of $301
million, compared with a pre-tax loss of $255 million in the year-ago period. The year-overyear improvement primarily reflected the impact of new Land Rover products, resulting in a
richer mix and improved net pricing. Fourth-quarter sales totaled $8 billion, compared to
$7.8 billion a year ago.

ASIA PACIFIC AND AFRICA/MAZDA
For the full year, Asia Pacific and ,Urica/Mazda reported a pre-tax profit of $316 million,
compared with a pre-tax profit of $163 million a year ago. In the fourth quarter, Asia Pacific
and Africa/l\Iazda reported a pre-tax loss of $7 million, compared with a pre-tax loss of $22
million in 2004.

Asia Pacific and Africa: For full-year 2005, Asia Pacific and Africa reported a pre-tax profit
of$61 million, an improvement of$16 million when compared with the year ago period.
The improvement primarily reflected favorable exchange and higher volume, which was
partially offset by unfavorable vehicle mix and higher costs. full-year sales totaled $7.7
b:illion, an increase from $7 billion in 2004.

For the fourth quarter, Asia Pacific and Africa reported a pre-tax loss of $39 million,
compared with a pre-tax loss of $13 million in the year-ago period. The decline primarily
reflected deterioration of results in Ford ~\ustralia due to lower \"olumes and unfavorable
mix. fourth-quarter sales totaled $1.8 billion, compared to $1.6 billion in 2004.

Mazda: For full-year 2005, Ford's share of the pre-tax profit of Mazda and associated
operations was $255 million, compared with $118 million a year ago. h)r the fourth quarter,
Ford's share of the pre-tax profit of Mazda and associated operations was a pre-tax-profit of
$,)2 million, compared with a pre-tax loss of $9 million a year ago. The improvement in both
periods primarily reflected gains in our investment in Mazda's convertible bonds, as well as
higher operating results at Mazda.

FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
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Financial Services Sector results include The Hertz Corporation through Dec. 21, 2005, the
date on which it was sold. For the full year, excluding special items, Ford's Financial Services
sector reported a pre-tax profit of $4.4 billion, compared with a pre-tax profit of $5 billion
last year. 1;or the fourth quarter, excluding special items, the financial Services Sector earned
a pre-tax profit of $881 million, compared with pre-tax profits of $1 billion a year ago.

Ford Motor Credit Company: Ford J\fotor Credit reported net income of $2.5 billion in
2005, down $370 million from a year earlier. On a pre-tax basis from continuing operations,
Ford l\Iotor Credit earned $3.9 billion in 2005, down $570 million from 2004.

In the fourth quarter of 2005, ford Motor Credit's net income was $465 million, down $78
million from a year earlier. On a pre-tax basis from continuing operations, Ford Motor
Credit earned $737 million in the fourth quarter, compared with $859 million the previous
year. The decrease in earnings in both fourth-quarter and full-year 2005 primarily reflected
lower volumes and margins, partially offset by lower credit losses.

The Hertz Corporation: Hertz reported a full-year 2005 pre-tax profit of $569 million,
excluding special items, which was a year-(}\Ter-year improvement of $76 million. Hertz
reported a fourth-quarter pre-tax profit of $121 million, excluding special items, which was
an increase of $14 million from the same
period in 2004.

Ford Motor Company, a global automotive industry leader based in Dearborn, Mich.,
manufactures and distributes automobiles in 200 markets across six continents. With
about 300,000 employees, the company's core and affiliated automotive brands include
Aston Martin, Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, Lincoln, Mazda, Mercury and Volvo. Its
automotive-related services include Ford Motor Credit Company.
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VITA
Kenneth "\. Ryan was born B l;ebruary 1968. He graduated from Belleville
Township High School- West in the spring of 1986 and was selected as a member of the
National I-Ionor Society.
After graduating high school, he attended St. Louis

L~niversity

- Parks Engineering

School in the fall of 1986 and graduated in 1990 with a Bachelor of Science in "\erospace
Engineering (BSAE). Expanding his knowledge base, Kenneth enrolled at the University of
l\[issouri - Columbia in the fall of 1990 graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in
Mechanical Engineering (BSl\IE) in 1991 on the Dean\ List.
Kenneth then went to work for Vitek Systems of l\IcDonnell Douglas Corp. in St.
Louis, MO as a research and development engineer. He left Vitek Systems and entered
service with the United States i\ir Force commissioned a 2m' LT in l\farch 1992. Selected for
Flight Training, he went through L'ndergraduate Pilot Training (LWI) flying T-37 Tweets and
T -38 Talons finishing first in his class. From LTPT, Kenneth was selected to fly ,\ir

Superiority fighters accumulating time in 1"-15's. In 1995, Lt Ryan moved to Pensacola, 1'1,
to spend a year in the ,\ir Force / Navy Joint Pilot Exchange Program training in Navy flight
squadrons accumulating time in F/,\-18's. Capt. Ryan went back to the ,\ir l;orce's 33'''
Fighter Wing based in Ft. Walton Beach, Fl" and left ,\ctive Duty l\ir Force in 1998.
Mr. Ryan now works for Ford Motor Company as a Body Construction Engineer
de\'eloping the 2001 Explorer Sport Trac, the 2002 L'152 Explorer, 2006 li251 Explorer, and
now is in charge of the door stamping assembly and construction for Ford's 2009 1"-150
Truck.
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